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Abstract
This Article examines the institutional motivations that underlie several major
developments in the Supreme People's Court of China's recent policy-making.
Since 2007, the SPC has sent off a collection of policy signals that escapes
sweeping ideological labeling: it has publically embraced a populist view of
legal reform by encouraging the use of mediation in dispute resolution and
popular participation in judicial policy-making, while continuing to advocate
legal professionalization as a long-term policy objective. It has also eagerly
attempted to enhance its own institutional competence by promoting judicial
efficiency, simplifying key areas of civil law, and expanding its control over
lower court adjudication. This Article argues that the strongest institutional
motivation underlying this complex pattern of activity is, contrary to some
common assumptions, neither simple obedience to the Party leadership nor
internalized belief in some legal reform ideology, whether legal
professionalism or populism. Instead, it is the pragmatic strengthening of the
SPC's own financial security and sociopolitical status-the SPC is, in many
ways, a "rational actor" that pursues its institutional self-interest. This theory
of "institutional pragmatism" brings unique analytical cohesion to the SPC's
recent behavior, giving us a clearer sense of its current priorities and, perhaps,
its future outlook.
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INTRODUCTION
Within Western scholarship on contemporary Chinese law, the Supreme
People's Court of China ("SPC") is paradoxically both omnipresent yet
curiously ignored. Given its status as the highest court in China, few articles
on Chinese legal development can afford to ignore it.' The institutional
motivations behind the SPC's doctrinal and policy decision-making, however,
remain largely unknown: scholars have studied, in considerable detail, how the
SPC acts,2 but rarely why.3 Secrecy certainly shrouds SPC decision-making, but
secrecy is true of the entire Chinese Party-state. Yet, there is no lack of
voluminous studies on the intentions of the Chinese Communist Party's
leadership.4 A close study of the SPC's institutional motivations is especially
necessary as the Chinese judiciary enters a new era of ideological uncertainty
and tension, in which potentially contradictory ideals of legal reform sit side
by side in the SPC's work agenda, hinting at highly complex considerations
that lie beyond the rhetorical surface.
This is such a study. It argues that the strongest motivation underlying
much of the SPC's recent activity is, contrary to common assumptions, neither
obedience to Party leadership nor implementation of any legal reform
ideology-whether legal professionalism or some competing principle-but
'Articles that focus on certain subject matters, such as legislation or the public security
apparatus, tend to make less mention of the SPC. See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke,
Legislating for a Market Economy in China, in CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM: NEW DEVELOPMENTS,
NEW CHALLENGES 13 (Donald C. Clarke ed., China Quarterly Special Issues, New Ser. No.
8, 2008) [hereinafter CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM]; Murray Scot Tanner & Eric Green,
Principals and Secret Agents: Central versus Local Control Over Policing and Obstacles
to "Rule of Law" in China, in CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM 90.
2 The most systematic survey remains Susan Finder, The Supreme People 's Court of the
People's Republic of China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 145 (1993). A more recent overview that also
covers the entire Chinese judiciary can be found at RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG
MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 280-330 (2002). An excellent survey of post-2007 changes
in SPC doctrine is Benjamin Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality?.Historical Legacies
and Legal Reform, in MAO'S INVISIBLE HAND 165 (Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth Perry
eds., 2011).
' Certainly a few papers have discussed this issue, but even those analyses tend to be
brief and somewhat speculative, rarely occupying a prominent place in the paper. See
discussion infra pp. 22-24. Some scholars have discussed in considerable detail the
institutional motivations of lower courts, but not the SPC. See, e.g., Nicholas C.
Howson, Corporate Law in the Shanghai People's Courts, 19 92-2oo8: Judicial Autonomy
in a Contemporary Authoritarian State, 5 E. ASIA L. REV. 330 (2oo).
4 Recent works include RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA's
COMMUNIST RULERS (2010); THE CHINESE PARTY-STATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ADAPTATION
AND THE REINVENTION OF LEGITIMACY (Andre Laliberte & Marc Lanteigne eds., 2oo8);
RODERICK MACFARQUHAR, THE POLITICS OF CHINA (2004). For a detailed discussion of the
Party-state's recent legal reform agenda, see Carl F. Minzner, China's Turn Against Law,
59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011).
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the pragmatic strengthening of its own financial security and sociopolitical
status. This theory of "institutional pragmatism" brings unique analytical
cohesion to the complicated, even contradictory, policy signals the SPC has
sent off in recent years, giving us a clearer sense of its current priorities and,
perhaps, its future outlook.
Despite enormous political and institutional constraints,5 the Chinese
judiciary seemed to be slowly advancing, as recently as 2007, towards greater
judicial independence, legal professionalization, and perhaps even some power
of constitutional review. 6 Scholars fiercely debated the merits and future
potential of these developments,7 but most agreed that the developments
' Virtually no study of the Chinese judiciary fails to mention these. See, e.g., Benjamin L.
Liebman, China's Courts: Restricted Reform, 21 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 21-29 (2007);
PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 298-316; Finder, supra note 2, at 148-59.
6 For a guardedly optimistic overview of Chinese legal development up to 2000, see
PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 282, 318-22 (2002). Discussing the 1995 to 2005 period,
Liebman points out that development towards legal professionalism and the rule of law
has been "restricted," but also notes that at least some significant progress was being
made, often through the initiatives of lower courts. Liebman, supra note 5. Likewise, Fu
Hualing and Richard Cullen argue that, prior to 2005, the judiciary was on the path
towards greater judicial professionalism and "adjudicative" justice, although they also
note that, due to Party interference, some of those trends were being challenged during
the later Xiao Yang years. Hualing Fu & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to
Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil Justice Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 25 (Margaret Y. K. Woo ed., 2011).
Mainland Chinese scholars have argued that the Chinese judiciary actually deserves a
more "positive assessment." Shen Kui, Commentary on "China's Courts: Restricted
Reforms", in CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 85, 89. See also, Jonas Grimheden,
The Reform Path of the Chinese Judiciary, 3o FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1000 (2007) ("The
reform process of the Chinese judiciary . . .is impressive .... [It] has been making
headway towards enhanced professionalism, stature and independence."). Other
American scholars point out that the Chinese Party-state has clearly promoted the rule
of law for much of the past decade, but primarily as a tool to enhance its own
legitimacy. See Keith Hand, Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang
Incident and Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People's Republic of China, 45
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 114, n6 (20o6). Liebman would agree that the
"[pirofessionalization of legal actors and institutions is perhaps the single most
significant accomplishment of China's legal reforms." Liebman, supra note 2, at 7.
7 Most western scholars would agree that the trend towards legal professionalism and
the rule of law is positive, but not nearly strong enough. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 5,
at 41-44; Clarke, supra note 1; Grimheden, supra note 6. Mainland Chinese scholars,
most famously Zhu Suli, have sometimes been critical of these assessments. See Su Li
()T)J), Song Fa Xiaxiang: Zhongguo Jiceng Sifa Zhidu Yanjiu (5i±8F t;: r NEM-'1
IJI R ) [SENDING LAW DOWN TO THE COUNTRYSIDE: A STUDY OF LOCAL JUDICIAL
INSTITUTIONS IN CHINA] (2000). See also Sida Liu, Beyond Global Convergence: Conflicts
of Legitimacy in a Chinese Lower Court, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 75 (2006) (providing
empirical evidence to suggest that legal professionalization initiatives have limited
effect on local courts). Other Chinese scholars have been more receptive to legal
professionalism ideals. See, e.g., He Weifang (J 7), Zhongguo Sifa Guanli Zhidu de
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themselves were real. If the judiciary remained a "bird in a cage, '8 to borrow
Stanley Lubman's famous metaphor, then at least the cage was expanding.
2oo8, however, threatened to shatter such optimism. In March, the
National People's Congress appointed Wang Shengjun to replace the retiring
Xiao Yang as SPC president. The "parachuting" of a party bureaucrat with no
legal education or court experience into the nation's top judicial post
suggested that the Party-state wished to impose closer political control over
the judiciary.9 In a series of speeches made soon after his appointment, Wang
argued that courts should follow the "Three Supremes": the supremacy of the
Party, the supremacy of popular interests, and the supremacy of the
constitution and law.'° Dismayed legal scholars noted that that the list placed
Party and popular interests ahead of the constitution and law, and that Party
interest was the "First Supreme.""
Liang Ge Wenti (q3 I -13011M 'ti-]H [Two Problems in China's System of
Judicial Administration], Zhongguo Shehui Faxue (4' m[i± 4) [Soc. SCI. CHINA], no.
6, 1997, at n6, available at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleDetail.
asp?ArticleId=371; Xu Aiguo ( Wei Fazhi er Douzheng-Xi Su Li de "Fazhi ji
Bentu Zhiyuan" ( ( ) [The Struggle for the
Rule of Law: An Analysis of Su Li's 'The Rule of Law and Native Resources'], in i Beida
Faxue Wencun (0 M*50Y) [PEKING UNIVERSITY LAW ANTHOLOGY] 274 (Beijing Daxue
Faxueyuan [ [Peking Univ. Law Sch.] ed., 2002), available at
http://www.law-star.com/cacnew/zoo9o2/235o2975z.htm.
8 STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO (1999).
9 See, e.g., Wang Liping (iU), Sifa Gaige Wulu Ketui - [There is
No Way Back for Judicial Reform], He Weifang de Bolaoge ('A 17j1M, M*[ J) [HE
WEIFANG'S BLOG] (Sept. 5, 2oo8, 11:54 PM), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_
4886632ooi0oawek.html; Long Fu (A5k), Cong "Xiao Yang" dao "Wang Shengjun", Kan
Zhongguo Sifa Gaige Hequ Hecong (k","Ji{ ", -
[Gauging the Future of Chinese Legal Reform from the Transition: From Xiao Yang to
Wang Shengjun], Faliji Buluo de blog (' fflrM, blog) [LEGAL TRIBE'S BLOG] (Nov. 18,
2oo8, 6:32 PM), http://fono5.fyfz.cn/art/4o7195.htm.
Wang Shengjun (T .i1), Gaoju Qr'zhi Yushi Jujin Nuli Kaichuang Renmin Fayuan
Gongzuo Xinjumian (AJWM%5, -14fiA{-. -)jfjf NA", )) [Raise High
the Flag and Vigorously Establish a New Situation in the Work of People's Courts],
Zhongguo Fayuan Wang (4lHMI&IMl) [CHINA COURTS NET] (Aug. 7, 2oo8, 9:16 AM),
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3i6o78. This concept had actually
made its debut in late 2007 speeches by Party Secretary Hu Jintao, but it was Wang's
vigorous advocacy that alerted the Chinese legal world to its potential ramifications for
judicial reform.
" He Weifang ( iTl2), San Ge Zhishang Sui Zhishang? (-LA1:. L?) [Which of
the "Three Supremes" is Supreme?], He Weifang de Bolaoge ( i-7J1b,#,) [HE
WEIFANG'S BLOG] (Aug. 27, 2008, 4:54 PM), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_
48866320010oatga.html.
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The "Second Supreme," the supremacy of popular interests, has also had a
powerful effect on SPC policy. Since 2o08, scholars have commented on the
reincarnation of "populism"-defined broadly as promoting judicial
responsiveness to and incorporation of public opinion, and often tied to non-
adjudicatory methods of dispute resolution-as a guiding SPC doctrine.'" The
SPC's advocacy of this doctrine actually began in the later Xiao Yang era, but
few would dispute that such advocacy has intensified after Wang's
appointment. The doctrine has led to, most prominently, stronger emphasis
on mediation as a favored dispute resolution method and higher sensitivity
towards popular opinion. Much of this agenda seems to push in the opposite
direction of legal formality, professionalism, and judicial independence.
There is, however, no indication that the SPC has given up on these latter
ideals. Quite the opposite, they- remain firmly on the SPC's list of guiding
principles, side by side with the promotion of populism. At the very least, the
"supremacy of the constitution and laws" remains the "Third Supreme."'3 The
SPC continues to emphasize the need for objective, independent, and
doctrinally consistent judicial decision-making by professionally trained
judges. As Benjamin Liebman acutely points out in a recent paper, the Chinese
judiciary, starting with the SPC, is now characterized by "tension between
trends toward professionalism and populism."'4
What institutional motivations drive the SPC's recent "populist turn?" One
fairly popular approach is to see the SPC as essentially a loyal footsoldier of the
Party leadership: it is simply implementing a broader "turn against law" that
the leadership asks of the entire law enforcement apparatus. 5 Because it is just
carrying out orders and therefore lacks substantive agency in judicial policy-
,2 Liebman, supra note 2, at 11, provides a basic description of "legal populism":
The Ma Xiwu method embodied core elements of the CCP's legal ideology.
Law became inseparable from politics and was designed to advance Party
policy. Law was practical and adaptable, not rigid or constraining. Legal
institutions were neither independent nor specialized, and professionalism
was explicitly rejected. Written law yielded to actual experiences; a correct
decision was one that met the emotions of the masses.
For other discussions of the recent "populist turn" in Chinese legal reform, see Minzner,
supra note 4; Zang Dongsheng, Rise of Political Populism and the Trouble with the Legal
Profession in China, 6 HARV. CHINA REV. 79 (20o); Randall Peerenboom, Between Global
Norms and Domestic Realities: Judicial Reforms in China, 2010 LAWASIA J. i; Eva Pils,
Yang Jia and China's Unpopular Criminal Justice System, CHINA RTS. F., Mar. 2oog, at 59,
available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/CRF.i.2oo 9 /CRF-zoo 9 -1-Pils.pdf (discussing
the SPC's embracement of populism under Wang Shengjun).
'3 Wang, supra note io.
14 Liebman, supra note 2, at 1, 7.
15 See Minzner, supra note 4; Fu & Cullen, supra note 6, at 54-66 (discussing how the
Party leadership pressured the judiciary to move away from "adjudicative justice");
Zang, supra note 12.
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making, there is no pressing need to analyze the SPC's own institutional
motivations. This is undoubtedly true to some extent. Indeed, we know well
the political and institutional constraints that the judiciary faces, which the
recent advent of "the supremacy of the Party" only reemphasizes.
Nevertheless, it would be a serious exaggeration to assume that these
constraints and pressures leave no room at all for the SPC or other courts to
develop and implement a "mind of their own." The gradual development of
legal professionalism over the past decade has undoubtedly increased the
judiciary's overall functional independence, if only because legal matters have
become more complicated.'6 Many acknowledge that the legal system is not
merely "a passive participant in the reform process,' ' '7 and that the SPC in
particular is capable of considerable "activism.' 8 While these observations are
not fundamentally inconsistent with the basic presumption of Party control,
they do highlight the need to take the SPC's own interests and intentions more
seriously. Directives from the Party leadership may well establish basic
parameters for SPC activity, but the technical complexity of the Chinese
judiciary will usually create considerable room for maneuvering within those
parameters. As the empirical evidence below repeatedly suggests, the SPC does
possess substantive agency in determining China's legal reform agenda.
If so, how should we interpret the SPC's recent endorsement of legal
populism? The technical complexity of reform measures under this rhetorical
umbrella suggests that something more than simple-minded adherence to
higher policy directives is at work here.'9 One possible approach is to take the
SPC at its word: if it claims to believe in populist ideals, then perhaps it
actually does. One can certainly point to significant continuities between the
SPC's recent populist rhetoric and dispute resolution practices from the Party's
earlier years, suggesting that there really is a genuine "Chinese socialist
tradition" of populist lawmaking.2" It would not be surprising, therefore, if the
SPC leadership had internalized significant elements of this tradition, which
then came into conflict with its partial internalization of legal professionalism
ideals. In this view, the "tension between trends toward professionalism and
populism" is ideologically genuine.
16 See discussion supra note 6.
17 Liebman, supra note 2, at 3.
18 Finder, supra note 2, at 223-24. The SPC has actually drawn criticism for its
"dangerous activism," and for overstepping its constitutional boundaries. See infra
notes 57, 58, 2o6 and 207.
'9 See discussion infra Part III. See also, Liebman, supra note 2, at 24 ("Efforts to position
the current work of the courts as consistent with revolutionary traditions may in
significant part consist of using revolutionary language to pursue divergent and diffuse
goals.").
20 See Liebman, supra note 2, at 13-15, 16 ("Most aspects of the modern sifa weirnin
movement trace their roots to Ma Xiwu.").
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This approach encounters empirical difficulties, however, when we place
the SPC's populist rhetoric within a broader context of recent judicial
developments. Despite the rhetorical emphasis placed on populism and
professionalism, some key developments in recent SPC doctrine and policy do
not easily relate to either trend, or even to the Party-state's increased control
over the judiciary. For example, the SPC has shown increasing interest in a
"cost and efficiency" (A - -*) (chengben yu xiaolu) approach towards trial
procedure and caseload management that has potentially enormous
ramifications for civil and administrative adjudication. The most significant
measures in this agenda, which encourage judges to coercively apply summary
procedure to civil cases, actually contradict both ideological frameworks and
show no clear relation to external political pressure.' Likewise, a controversial
draft interpretation of the Marriage Law, which drastically cuts down on the
scope of marital property, does not logically derive from any ideological stance,
but instead suggests a straightforward desire to simplify civil adjudication and
a deep concern for the potential overextension of judicial resources." The
strength of this concern, also seen in the "cost and efficiency" reforms, seems
disproportionate to any outright political pressure the SPC might have faced,
any actual financial shortages, or any noticeable deficiency in case-processing
speeds. It instead reflects a strategic concern for the judiciary's longer-term
financial health under uncertain political conditions. And with the recent
establishment of a "guiding cases" system, which gives stare decisis-like
authority to select cases, the SPC has strengthened its powers of judicial
interpretation, albeit in a careful and low-key fashion that avoids the wrath of
other government branches or the Party leadership.
2 3
This Article argues that academic analysis of the current SPC legal reform
agenda must recognize that the SPC, no less than any local court, 4 is a deeply
pragmatic institution keen on protecting and enhancing its own political,
social, and financial health. Self-interested pragmatism, rather than ideological
commitment, underlies the developments discussed above: the initiative to
accelerate and simplify case-processing decreases both the judiciary's financial
reliance on other branches of government and its exposure to potentially
contentious social disputes. The pursuit of these objectives makes good sense
for a politically vulnerable institution with very limited financial independence,
especially after the various personnel changes in 2oo8 reemphasized that
vulnerability and when the Party-state is entering a period of great political,
economic, and fiscal uncertainty. The expansion of. the SPC's judicial
interpretation capacity through "guiding cases" indicates, however, that the
SPC is certainly not adverse to expansions of its authority when the
See discussion infra Part II.A.
22 See discussion infra Part II.B.
2' See discussion infra Part II.C.
24 For the strategic decision-making of lower courts, see, e.g., Howson, supra note 3.
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sociopolitical risk is low. It is a move entirely consistent with the overall
impression of institutional pragmatism.
Furthermore, the SPC's handling of both legal professionalism and
populism over the past decade arguably derives as much from pragmatic
maneuvering as it does from genuine ideological commitment. The judiciary
stands to gain much and perhaps lose relatively little by promoting mediation,
cooperation with other government institutions, and responsiveness to
popular opinion. These measures help it avoid having to take a clear stance in
socially or politically controversial disputes and thus lower its exposure to
criticism and pressure. The precise methods the SPC has taken to promote
mediation are arguably more attuned with a theory of institutional
pragmatism than with one that stresses the SPC's ideological internalization of
populism.25 Indeed, many have interpreted the SPC's earlier eagerness to
promote legal professionalism and constitutional review as a campaign to
increase its own authority and power under relatively accommodating
sociopolitical conditions.26 All things considered, institutional pragmatism is
one of the strongest explanations-quite possibly the strongest-for the SPC's
recent activities, and therefore one of the best predictors of its future course..
Of course, institutional pragmatism is not the. only factor that determines
the SPC's behavior. Many SPC judges, including the handful of justices at the
top, may genuinely believe in the validity of professionalism and populism,
although this hardly means that realist calculations of interest are incapable of
affecting, or dominating, SPC decision-making. Likewise, directives from the
Party leadership may well set basic boundaries for acceptable judicial behavior,
but there is usually considerable maneuvering room within those boundaries.
This Article complements, not replaces, suggestions that the "tension"
between professionalism and populism is ideologically genuine,27 or that the
Party leadership exerts significant control over judicial activity. 8 It does,
however, demonstrate the need to go beyond them if we are to accurately
understand the SPC.
On a more theoretical and comparative note, the treatment of judiciaries
as pragmatic and utilitarian institutions that actively pursue their institutional
self-interest is fairly common in studies of pre-modern or early modern legal
25 See discussion infra pp. 22-24.
26
See, e.g., Zhiwei Tong, A Comment on the Rise and Fall of the Supreme People's Court's
Reply to Qi Yuling's Case, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 669, 671-74 (2oo) (discussing the SPC's
motivations behind the Qi Yuling case); Xin He, The Judiciary Pushes Back: Law, Power
and Politics in Chinese Courts, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL
RULE OF LAW PROMOTION 18o (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2009) (discussing recent
attempts by the judiciary to strengthen its political position vis-A-vis other government
organs).
27 Such suggestions are discussed infra pp. 22-23.
See supra note 15.
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history. 29 Yet, scholars seem somewhat more hesitant to attach such
motivations to contemporary judiciaries in developed nations, with important
0 To Western legal scholars, the most familiar example would probably be the late-
medieval and early modern jurisdictional competition between various Western
European legal systems, both secular and ecclesiastical. See, e.g., HAROLD BERMAN, LAW
AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 10 (1983) (outlining
the basic thesis of jurisdictional competition); BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND
STATE, 1050-1300 (1964) (tracing the development of 12' h Century Canon Law as a
concentrated effort to expand Papal jurisdiction and authority). The relationship
between these various courts was certainly more complex than just competition for
influence, see, e.g., R. H. HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND 263-89 (1987)
(discussing the intellectual exchanges and influences between judges of various
jurisdictions); JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT
DOCTRINE (1991) (arguing that modern contract law has origins in modern philosophical
developments), but that at least seemed to be one prevalent part of it. In England, some
level of competition also emerged among various royal courts-between common law
and equity courts, but also between various common law courts. See Daniel Klerman,
Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179
(2oo9); Todd Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side
Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1551, 1581-1621 (2003) (arguing that jurisdictional
competition drove common law courts to create more economically efficient legal
doctrine); JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 40-47 (4 th ed.
2002) (describing the "internecine struggle for business between the common-law
courts" after 155o); RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1720-1844, at 25-26 (2000) (noting that Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Century common law courts "competed with each other over litigants");
MARJORIE BLATCHER, THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, 1450-155o: A STUDY IN SELF-HELP (1978)
(tracing the development of common law doctrine in the Court of King's Bench as a
conscious effort by the court to expand its influence and authority). But see S.F.C.
MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW (2d ed. 1981) (presenting the
development of the common law largely as the intellectual development of legal
doctrine by professionally-minded jurists); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 292-95 (1975) (arguing against
the existence of substantial judicial competition). Backtracking chronologically, Roman
judges also seemed to follow a highly pragmatic legal philosophy that saw adjudication
and legal analysis primarily as means towards greater personal reputation and social
prestige. See ALAN WATSON, THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW (1995). Within the Chinese
context, scholars have long portrayed late-imperial local magistrates as pragmatic
judges who were highly self-conscious about their sociopolitical standing and allowed
such concerns to influence their legal decision-making, see, e.g.,.CH'UTUNG-TSU, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE CH'ING (1962); BRADLEY W. REED, TALONS AND TEETH:
COUNTY CLERKS AND RUNNERS IN THE QING DYNASTY (2000); Taisu Zhang, Property Rights
in Land and the Relative Decline of Pre-Industrial China, 13 SAN DIEGO INT. L.J. 129,158-63
(2o11). Some have also argued, with perhaps limited success, that they were in fact more
professionally disciplined. PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CIVIL JUSTICE IN CHINA: REPRESENTATION
AND PRACTICE IN THE QING 119 (1996) (arguing that magistrates rigorously followed legal
rules in the vast majority of cases); Mark A. Allee, Code, Culture, and Custom:
Foundations of Civil Case Verdicts in a Nineteenth-Century County Court, in CIVIL LAW
IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA 122, 126-27 (Philip C.C. Huang & Kathryn Bernhardt eds.,
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exceptions, particularly in the corporate law realm.30 For example, while many
constitutional scholars have accused United States Supreme Court justices of
judicial activism-i.e., promoting their preferred sociopolitical ideology3' -
fewer have considered whether they regularly attempt to enhance the
Supreme Court's institutional authority or political status. 32 A possible
1994) (reaching the opposite conclusion of Huang based on similar sources); Zhang,
supra note 29 (likewise).
30 The jurisdictional competition thesis has been routinely applied to the development
of corporate law. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14-24
(1993); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1438 .(1992); FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 212-27
(1991). But see Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 684 (2002). For other legal fields, see discussion
infra note 32.
31 See, e.g., James R. Rogers & Georg Vanberg, Resurrecting Lochner: A Defense of
Unprincipled Judicial Activism, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 442, 442 (2007) (noting that "the
worst" we assume of activist judges is that "they are an unprincipled lot who seek only
to implement narrow, class-based personal policy preferences"); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 3 (1993) (commenting that the problem with the activist courts
of the early 20 th century was that.they were "assaulting the doctrine of separation of
powers by substituting its conception of good, effective policy-making for that of the
legislature"); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 138-39 (1993) (describing a
tradition of constitutional legal scholarship, including Alexander Bickel, Robert Burt,
Frank Michelman, and Michael Perry, that sees the Supreme Court as "playing the
prophet of the modern American Republic"). While critical of the portrayal of the
Supreme Court as legal prophet, Ackerman nonetheless sees the Supreme Court's
major "constitutional moments" as good-faith attempts to participate in a process of
constitutional change that has roots in the founding of the Republic. Id. at 140-62.
32 A common assumption is that the Supreme Court is so institutionally secure that
such considerations are unnecessary. See discussion infra note 267. For discussion and
criticism of this trend, see' BRUCE ACKERMAN, DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1-4 (2010) ("Constitutional thought is in a triumphalist phase."). There are key
exceptions. The most important is probably a group of articles on "strategic voting" in
the Supreme Court, which examine the political considerations that limit and guide
certain aspects of Supreme Court adjudication. This includes, among others, William
N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1O YALE L.J.
331 (1991) (analyzing how the anticipated reaction of other government organs
influences the Supreme Court's decision-making); John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A
Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 263 (1992); P.T.
Spiller & E.H. Tiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process
and Judicial Review, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (1997); Michael E. Solimine & Rafael Gely, The
Supreme Court and the DIG: An Empirical and Institutional Analysis, 2005 Wisc. L. REV.
1421. See also JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT ADMINISTRATION
(Christopher E. Smith ed., 1995) (a collection of essays which examine the influence of
political practicalities and institutional limitations on the federal judiciary's doctrinal
shifts) and the discussion infra note 264.
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explanation for this difference is that judiciaries in contemporary Western
nations enjoy considerable institutional security and are well-entrenched
within a tradition of governance, whereas earlier judiciaries faced far greater
sociopolitical uncertainty and theoretical ambiguity and thus were more likely
to engage in pragmatic maneuvering.33 In terms of institutional security, the
Chinese judiciary has far more in common with these historical judiciaries
than it does with, say, the Supreme Court of the United States, suggesting that
our emphasis on its institutional pragmatism is not terribly unconventional.
The institutional pragmatism discussed here is quite different from the
"legal pragmatism" and "flexibility" often attributed to Chinese legal reform in
general.3' These latter concepts speak primarily to the willingness of the Party-
state to adjust or overlook legal doctrine and procedure in order to
accommodate practical social, economic, and political needs. 35 While the
judiciary regularly and extensively participates in such behavior, its
"institutional self-interests" are narrower and sometimes different than the
Party-state's general policy objectives. Party leadership and other government
organs do not, for example, have the same level or type of interest in the
judiciary's long-term financial health or the SPC's judicial interpretation
powers. In fact, one may point to recent SPC actions that promote the
judiciary's short-term institutional interest at sociopolitical cost to the general
Party-state, suggesting that any coherent theory of Chinese legal reform must
allocate significant institutional agency to the judiciary.
A study of the SPC's institutional pragmatism seems especially timely
given the recent signs of heightened Party control over the judiciary. First,
stronger Party control may well heighten the judiciary's political survival
33 A fairly common observation made by the various authors cited supra notes 29 and
32 is that pragmatic or "strategic" judicial decision-making often stems from the
judiciary's institutional vulnerabilities. See, e.g., Klerman, supra note 29, at 1186-87
(noting that the various English courts competed for legal fees because none had a
reliably monopoly over a category of cases); BAKER, supra note 29, at 44 (likewise);
BLATCHER, supra note 29 (focusing more specifically on the vulnerabilities of King's
Bench); Eskridge, supra note 32 (discussing how the Executive and Congress' ability to
override judicial interpretation prompts strategic decision-making by the Supreme
Court). From there, it is but a small step to the thesis that more institutional security
and authority decreases the need for strategic behavior.
14 See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 2, at 2-9 (discussing China's "adaptive legality"); Liang
Zhiping (i l'), Fazhi: Shehui Zhuanxing Shiqi de Zhidu Jianshe (i'i8: z U 14M
M1-i) [Rule of Law: Institution Building in a Time of Social Transition], in Fazhi
zai Zhongguo: Zhidu, Huayu yu Shijian ( R$it. i&,Il: J, i---) [RULE OF LAW
IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, DISCOURSE, AND PRACTICE] 130 (Liang Zhiping [ tf] ed., 2002)
(noting the need for institutional flexibility and pragmatism in a time of social change);
Sebastian Heilmann, Policy Experimentation in China's Economic Rise, 43 STUD. COMP.
INT'L DEV. 1, 6-9 (2007) (noting the willingness of the Chinese state to experiment with
policy and lawmaking); Yu Xingzhong, Legal Pragmatism in the People's Republic of
China, 3 J. CHINESE L. 29 (1989).
15 See sources supra note 34.
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instincts and increase its willingness to sacrifice intellectual or ideological
clarity for practical institutional benefits. This could trigger a pattern of
behavior more flexible and pragmatic than what scholars observed a few years
ago. Second, institutional pragmatism offers important insights into where the
SPC may be headed in the future. Although promoting populism may be
consistent with the SPC's short-term need to avoid sociopolitical controversy
and pressure, over the long run, it cannot generate the expansion in authority
and influence that the judiciary gains by advancing legal professionalism. We
may therefore feel more optimistic about the future of legal professionalism in
China than the SPC's recent populist rhetoric would suggest, if only because a
long-term trend towards professionalism coincides with the SPC's institutional
self-interest.
Part I of this Article reviews the 2008 SPC leadership change and the
corresponding shift towards populism and surveys academic discussion of
these developments. Part II highlights the institutional pragmatism underlying
the SPC's ongoing "judicial cost and efficiency" initiative, the establishment of
-the "guiding cases" system, and several prominent judicial interpretations it
has recently worked on. Part III reexamines the SPC's approach to legal
professionalism and populism from the perspective of institutional self-
interest, arguing that self-interest was conceivably a key concern in its
handling of these ideological trends. The Conclusion fits these themes into a
broader theoretical discussion about the role of institutional pragmatism in
judicial behavior and comments on how the SPC's institutional pragmatism
may have long-term consequences for legal reform in China.
A preliminary note on conceptual definition: I follow Liebman in
understanding "legal professionalism" to cover the professionalization of both
legal actors and institutions. 6 It is thus understood as a broad ideal that
incorporates both the monopolization of legal practice and law enforcement
by trained professionals and, moreover, at least a "thin" version of the rule of
law, in which legal rules effectively constrain state action regardless of their
precise content.37 Establishing such a rule of law is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for legal professionalism, as it is at least conceptually
possible to have general obedience to law without the use of trained
professionals.
36 Liebman, supra note 2, at 7.
37 Id. For discussion on "thick" and "thin" versions of the rule of law, see PEERENBOOM,
supra note 2, at 2-6. The classic work on this subject is LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAw (1976). Simply put, a "thin" version demands that laws be "general, public,
prospective, clear, consistent, capable of being followed, stable, and enforced," whereas
thicker versions incorporate certain elements of political morality, including free-
market ideals and various conceptions of human-rights. PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 3.
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I. THE SPC UNDER NEW LEADERSHIP
For much of the Post-Mao era, Western observers seemed to feel that
Chinese judicial reforms were, if slow, largely praise-worthy: greater legal
professionalism, expanding civil and administrative jurisdiction, a slowly
growing amount of judicial independence, and baby steps towards establishing
some judicial power of constitutional review.38 The judiciary emphasized the
importance of formal judicial education in its hiring process and intensified
professional training for judges..39 And increasingly, the judiciary attempted to
assert independence from outside influences, including the media and some
other government organs, by stressing the professionally legal nature of their
work.4" The SPC moved to improve the quality and uniformity of judicial
reasoning, while strengthening the judiciary's enforcement powers. ' In
administrative cases, which are especially sensitive as they involve suits
38 See sources discussed supra notes 6, 7 and 26.
19 Faguan Fa (&i ) [Judges Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., June 30; 2OO, effective Jan. 1, 2002) art. 9, 2001 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S
CONG. GAz. 388, available at http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-o5/26/content-lO26.htm;
Guanyu Jiaqiang Faguan Duiwu Zhiyehua Jianshe de Ruogan Yijian (9 1TMI&M1 )
I ,kIIUf.I9 M) [Opinions on Strengthening the Professionalism of the Judicial
Corps] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., July 18, 2002, effective July 18, 2002) art.
26, SuP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ., Apr. 1, 2002, at 114, available at http://law.lawtime
.cn/d41166641676o.html; Wu Huanqing & Tian Yu (!IW)5IM & !ii1I),'Xianzhi Faguan
Jiangzai 5 Nian lei Quanbu Dadao Benke Xueli ( , 5 'i-4 1!V*JTJ)
[All Current judges Will Obtain Professional Degree Within 5 Years], Xinhua Wang (,ffi
-R) [XINHUA NET] (Sept. 5, 2002, 4:54 PM), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com
/newscenter/2002-09/05/content_551349.htm (describing a SPC directive requiring that
all judges below the age of forty must acquire a professional degree within five years
and that older judges must at least obtain some additional training); Tian Yu ([a li),
Wenping Shangqu * Shuiping Tigao, Faguan Peixun bu Buneng Zhi Benzhe Wenping
Qu (30C2t l)11, T1 ',IL R ) [An Advanced Degree Does Not
Equal Enhanced Ability, Judges' Training Should Not Solely Aim at Degrees], Xinhua
Wang (,P4 I) [XINHUA NET] (Mar. 11, 2004, 3:45 PM), http://news3.xinhuanet.com/
newscenter/2004-03/n/content_136o136.htm.
40 Liebman, supra note 5, at 14-19.
4" Guanyu zai Quanguo Fayuan Minshi he Xingzheng Shenpan Bumen Kaizhan "Guifan
Sifa Xingwei, Cujin Sifa Gongzheng" Zhuanxiang Zhenggai Huodong de Tongzhi (-
1l) [Notice Regarding Implementing the "Standardizing Judicial Acts, Enhancing
Judicial Justice" Special Modification and Correction Event in the Civil and
Administrative Divisions in People's Courts Nationwide] (promulgated by the Sup.
People's Ct., July 15, 2005, effective July 15, 2005), available at htip://www.law-lib.com/
law/lawview.asp?id=lo6254; Liebman, supra note 5, at 13, 15-16.
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against government actors, courts took tentative steps to expand their
jurisdiction.42
Of course, the judiciary's relationship to other government organs or the
Party underwent no fundamental change. Lower courts remained financially
dependent on local governments, despite proposals by the SPC to centralize
judicial funding, and at no time did the judiciary seem prepared to effectively
constrain the Party's authority.4 3 Many, perhaps most, legal reform projects
came with express government or Party approval." Indeed, the courts may
have played a lesser role in legal change compared to other government
organs.45
Nonetheless, one could sense that courts were not merely "passive" agents
of the Party-state, obediently carrying out the policy directives they received. 6
Instead, they actively pursued reforms that would boost judicial
professionalism and institutional competence. These were objectives that
many Western observers supported, even if the reforms took place at an
agonizingly slow pace. Indeed, if one took a long-term approach, the trend
towards professionalization might eventually safeguard against political abuse
of power.47 Even if this was impractical for the near future, greater legal
consistency and broader judicial competence nonetheless bode well for
China's economic development and integration into the global market.48
42 Li Fujin ( ) Xingzheng Shenpan de Kunjing yu Chulu (JiaWJ11M -INJA
[The Difficult Situation of Administrative Adjudication and the Way Out], Dongfang
Fayan ( l ) [E. LEGAL PERSP.] (Nov. 19, 2003, 8:33 PM), http://www.dffy.com/
faxuejieti/xz/200 3u/ 200311192o3349.htm. One notable development was the allowance of
suits against public universities under the Administrative Litigation Law. See Thomas F.
Kellogg, "Courageous Explorers"?: Education Litigation and Judicial Innovation in China,
20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 141 (2007).
I3 Liebman, supra note 5, at 19 ("Courts do not appear more likely to challenge Party
authority than in the past."). For the judiciary's lack of financial independence, see,
among other articles, He Weifang ( -&j), Sifa Gaige de Bada Nanti ( MEMMAK
) [Eight Great Difficulties with Judicial Reform], Haikou Shenpan (.4nl l)
[HAIKOU TRIAL], no. 1, 2002, at 4, available at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article-
print.asp?articleid=1968 4 .
'" Hand, supra note 6; Liebman, supra note 5, at 2, 37-39 (discussing the Party-state's
interest in developing a relatively effective and professional judiciary). If anything,
Western scholars tend to overemphasize the Party-state's control over the judiciary.
Compare Minzner, supra note 4, and Zang, supra note 12, with the discussion supra
note 26.
" The most economically significant changes to the Chinese legal system, for example,
have been made via legislation, not judicial action. See Clarke, supra note .
46 See discussion supra notes 16-18.
" For more optimistic assessments, see PEERENBOOM, supra note 6; Grimheden, supra
note 6. Others have expressed greater caution. See discussion supra note 7.
'8 See Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got to Do with It? Legal Institutions and Economic
Development in China, 1O UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 74-76 (1991) (discussing the value of
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Much of this came from "bottom-up" experimentation by lower courts,4 9
but the SPC also played a leading role in numerous issues. The Qi Yuling case5°
was, perhaps, the most controversial step the SPC took to expand judicial
authority. As divisive as the case soon became in academic circles, it
undeniably speaks volumes about the SPC's institutional ambitions at the
time. The case involved a young woman (Qi) who took a secondary school
entrance examination and passed. Another woman intercepted her admissions
letter, took on Qi's identity to enroll, and continued to use Qi's identity as she
found employment." Qi later discovered this and sued, claiming that she had
suffered "infringement of her right to her name and deprivation of her right to
an education."52 At the time, the only plausible legal source for the latter claim
was the Chinese constitution, leading the Provincial People's Court hearing
the case to seek the SPC opinion on awarding damages for an infringement of
stronger legal institutions to China's economic development); Clarke, supra note i
(discussing the role of stronger legal institutions in stimulating growth). There is, of
course, a substantial literature on whether formal legal institutions have played, or
need to play, a central role in promoting economic growth in China. Many authors
emphasize that informal institutions and property rights have been just as important, if
not more so, but few would go so far as to claim that further development of formal
legal institutions is undesirable or unnecessary in the long run. See Katharina Pistor &
Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessonsfrom China,
7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2005); Frank Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance and
Economic Growth in China, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 57 (2005); Donald C. Clarke, Economic
Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89 (2003);
Minxin Pei, Does Legal Reform Protect Economic Transactions? Commercial Disputes in
China, in ASSESSING THE VALUE OF LAw IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES 18o (Peter Murrell ed.,
2001).
49 Liebman, supra note 5, at 30-36.
50 Qi Yuling Su Chen Xiaoqi Deng yi Qinfan Xingming Quan de Shouduan Qinfan
Xianfa Baohu de Gongmin Shou Jiaoyu de Jiben Quanli Jiufen An (kl
REf)-, [Qi Yuling v. Chen
Xiaoqi et al., Case of Infringement of a Citizen's Constitutionally-Protected Basic Right
of Receiving Education by Infringing on Her Right of Name], SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ. 158
(Shandong High People's Ct. Aug. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Qi Yuling v. Chen Xiaoqi]. The
SPC reply document was Guanyu yi Qinfan Xingmingquan de Shouduan Qinfan Xianfa
Baohu de Gongmin Shou Jiaoyu de Jiben Quanli Shifou Ying Chengdan Minshi Zeren
de Pifu (-T - T-R- tit% : MMWM,
-*4{ittY) [Official Reply on Whether the Civil Liabilities Shall Be Borne for
Infringement on a Citizen's Constitutionally-Protected Basic Right of Receiving
Education by Means of Infringing on Her Right of Name] (promulgated by the Sup.
People's Ct., July 24, 2oo, effective Aug. 13, 20o, repealed Dec. 24, 2oo8), SUP. PEOPLE'S
CT. GAZ., May 1, 2001, at 152 [hereinafter SPC Reply. to Qi Yuling], availabl at
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law-view.asp?id=1 5 9 9 4 .
51 Qi Yuling v. Chen Xiaoqi, supra note 5o.
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a constitutional right. A year later, the SPC approved the damages, breaking
away from the previous convention that courts should not cite or rely on the
constitution in their judgments."3 And on the same day as the SPC's decision,
Huang Songyou, then chief judge of the SPC's First Civil Tribunal, published
an article in the SPC's official newspaper, claiming that he hoped the Chinese
judiciary would be able to find its own Marbury v. Madison and establish the
power of constitutional review in ordinary courts.
54
Realizing that this article was essentially a commentary on the Qi Yuling
decision, academic circles fervently debated whether the decision could really
ignite judicial constitutional review in China. Many pointed out serious flaws
in the SPC's legal reasoning, noting that the Chinese constitution gave courts
no express powers of constitutional review and that such powers were
explicitly left to the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee."5
Others found the decision dissatisfying, as it only recognized constitutional
rights against another individual, not against the government. 6 One thing did
seem clear: by issuing the decision and simultaneously allowing Huang to
11 SPC Reply to Qi Yuling, supra note 50. For a summary of the conventional view that
Chinese courts should not engage in constitutional review, see Thomas E. Kellogg,
Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics? Constitutional Development and Civil
Litigation in China, 7 INT. J. CON. L. 215, 220-26 (2009).
14 Huang Songyou (MA ), Xianfa Sifahua ji Qi Yiyi-Cong Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
Jintian de Yi Ge "Pifu" Tan Qi M3 L -- } k i- ((*L
V)) i i*) [The Significance of Institutionalizing the Constitution in Judicial Process-
On a Supreme People's Court Opinion], Renmin Fayuan Bao (AiMIR[) [PEOPLE'S CT.
DAILY], Aug. 13, 2oo, available at http://politics.csscipaper.com/lawclass/constitution/
23907.html.
5 See Zhai Xiaobo (ff /JNX), Daiyi Jiguan Zhishang de Renmin Xianzheng ({ i kff[
±(n A i) [People's Constitutional Governance Under the Parliamentary Supremacy
System], i Qinghua Faxue (M---) [TsINGHUA L. REV.] 35, 36 (2007); Liu Songshan (AIi
fUL), Weixian Shencha de Leng Sikao (i[ 'EV-,5A) [Thoughts on Cooling
Down the Constitutional Review Fever], 1 Faxue (&*) [LEGAL STUD.] 36 (2004); Tong
Zhiwei ( Zi), Xianfa Sifa Shiyong Yanjiu zhong de Jige Wenti (M8.YltM10P
rnfLIN6hJ-) [Various Problems in Research on the Usability of the Constitution], is
Faxue ('M-*) [LEGAL STUDIES] 3, 38, 51 (2001); Qiang Shigong ( 31Ii), Xianfa Sifahua de
Beilun ( 1 ly) [The Contradictory Theorizing of Judicialization of the
Constitution] 2 Zhongguo Shehui Kexue (rPM:tj zf-f) [Soc. SCd. CHINA] 18, 18-19
(2003).
56 See Tong Zhiwei ( _tTh, Xianfa Shiyong Ying Yixun Xianfa Benshen Guiding de
Lujing ( ,fJ 4l ) [The Constitution's Application Should
Follow the Path Stipulated by Constitution Itself], 6 Zhongguo Faxue (43 M,*) [CHINA
LEGAL SC.] 22, 27 (2008); Donald C. Clarke, Supreme People's Court Withdraws Qi
Yuling Interpretation, CHINESE L. PROF BLOG (Jan. 19, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.
com/china_lawprof blog/2oo9/o/supreme-peoples.html.
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publish his article in its official newspaper, the SPC leadership supported this
rather bold attempt to "expand judicial power. 5 7
Qi Yuling fits into the general trend "towards professionalization and
formality ' 8 that characterized judicial reforms from 1978 to the early 2000S.
The SPC's attempt to obtain constitutional review powers, if actually
successful, would have strengthened judicial independence, a key component
of legal professionalism-courts cannot stay true to their professional
judgment without possessing some measure of institutional independence.
Moreover, the SPC probably would not have attempted Qi Yuling without first
making some progress in strengthening judicial competence and
professionalism: an incompetent and unprofessional judiciary has no clear
justification for seeking powers of constitutional review. The expansionist
ambitions underlying Qi Yuling are therefore quite representative of the SPC's
general "institutional mentality" during this era.
While SPC leadership changes in 2008 seems to indicate a turning point in
the judiciary's institutional development, "populist" trends had arguably
emerged well before Wang Shengjun's appointment. The "justice for the
people" slogan appeared in SPC documents as early as 2003, when Xiao Yang
argued that courts should revive the legal traditions of the 1930s Jiangxi Soviet
era by "carefully following and enforcing laws that served the fundamental
interests of the people" rather than "private interests." 9 In other words, courts
needed to become more responsive to the practical and sentimental needs of
the general public: courts should, for example, respond swiftly to appeals,
conclude cases efficiently, apply simplified legal procedures when
appropriate, remind litigants of procedural requirements beforehand, inform
them of the risks associated with litigation, provide legal aid to those that
qualify, reduce processing fees for the poor, increase control over court-
direction mediation and its efficiency, and provide closer legal guidance to
people's mediation committees.
57 Tong, supra note 26.
58 Liebman, supra note 2, at 7.
11 Fan Wei & Li Yumei (rAt- & :, ), Zhongguo Shouji Dafaguan Xiao Yang: Sifa
Weimin Bu Shi Jiandan Kouhao ( I-Pt< 'I1A : . tKT[ n-QEy)
[Chinese Chief Justice Xiao Yang: Justice for the People Is Not a Simple Slogan],
Zhongguo Xinwen Wang ( ,'i ffl ffi ) [CHINA NEWS] (Sept. 20, 2003, 3:34 PM),
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/n/2003-o9-2o/26/348871.html. The formal SPC
document accompanying this interview was Guanyu Luoshi 23 Xiang Sifa Weimin Juti
Cuoshi de Zhidao Yijian (f 23 4-] it- P;Vbfi t l-9,&Y") [Guiding
Opinion of the Supreme People's Court on Twenty-Three Specific Measures for
Implementing Justice for the People] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 2,
2003, effective Dec. 2, 2003) SuP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ., June 1, 2003, at 9 [hereinafter
Twenty-Three Measures for Implementing Justice], available at http://www.
lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?id= 3301.
6o The use of summary procedure is explained in greater detail at infra, pp, 24-26.
61 Twenty-Three Measures for Implementing Justice, supra note 59.
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None of these measures, however, foreshadowed the SPC's "mediate
whenever possible" campaign' that has drawn so much academic attention in
recent years. 6 2 In 2004, SPC leadership began advocating a "mediate if
possible, adjudicate if appropriate" (Ai)Ai iQ i) , 4AiJ9[)JN) (neng tiao ze tiao,
dang pan ze pan) slogan in speeches and press releases. 63 These eventually led
to a 2007 SPC opinion that declared the "mediate if possible" slogn as a
"guiding agenda" of the Chinese judiciary, along with a strong emphasis on
"resolving cases and solving problems to promote social harmony" (A-
- a~liV) (anjie shiliao, cujin hexie). 6 4 SPC leaders felt that "excessive
attention to adjudication and emphasis on procedure ha[d] failed to resolve
disputes or social contradictions" and, therefore, that "courts must take more
pragmatic and involved approaches to solving problems.,,6 Initially, the SPC
took a reasonably moderate approach towards encouraging mediation, stating
that mediation could not be coerced and that courts should hesitate to set the
percentage of cases settled via mediation as a benchmark for judicial
performance.
66
From 2007 onwards, as Wang Shengjun replaced Xiao Yang as SPC
President, these populist trends-populist in that they emphasize judicial
responsiveness to public opinion67-swiftly grew in visibility. The "Three
Supremes" doctrine discussed above attracted a particularly large amount of
6, See supra note 12.
61Wu Jing (M), Xiao Yang: Mo Gei Tiaojie Ding Zhibiao (t: 1i4J$)
[Xiao Yang: Do Not Set Target Quotas for Mediation], Renmin Ribao (kH flR)
[PEOPLE'S DAILY], Jan. 17, 2007, at 14, available at http://politics.people.com.cn/
GB/1o27/ 5 29166 5 .html. Other SPC justices made follow-up statements, for example,
Tiaopan Jiehe Hexie Sifa (AJfJ -*' , ji) [Unify Mediation and Adjudication,
Judicial Harmony], Renmin Wang (,KARLM) [PEOPLE'S NET] (March 7, 2007, 3:49 PM),
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/323o6/54155/57487/54486o6.htmi (interview with SPC
justice Wan Exiang). For academic commentary, see Yi Zhongfa ( , , ), Lun "Anjie
Shiliao" (i" ---T") [Discussing "Deciding the Case and Solving the Problem'], 2
Fazhi yu Shehui (M$'J-1l- ) [LAw & Soc'Y] 194 (2oo8).
64 Guanyu Jin Yi Bu Fahui Susong Tiaojie zai Goujian Shehui Zhuyi Hexie Shehui zhong
Jiji Zuoyong de Ruogan Yijian (
&f{'PYU M -, "L) [Several Opinions on Further Enhancing the Positive Effect of
Court-Directed Mediation in the Construction of a Harmonious Socialist Society]
(promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Mar. 6, 2007, effective Mar. 6, 2007), SuP.
PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ., Apr. 1, 2007, at 25, available at http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/public/
detail.php?id=lo6477.
65 Liebman, supra note 2, at 17.
66 E.g. Wu, supra note 63.
67 See Liebman, supra note 2, at 7 (discussing the courts' professed desire to "better
serve the people and to be proactive in response to disputes" by deemphasizing legal
formality and promoting "populist" dispute-resolution methods).
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controversy among lawyers and academics,6 as did Wang's repeated praise for
Ma Xiwu, a Communist judge from the 1930s famous for promoting mediated
and informal means of dispute resolution over formal legal procedure.6
Wang's reference to Ma Xiwu's example in his March 2009 Work Report to the
National People's Congress was the first time an SPC work report had done so
since at least 1978.7' This prompted a senior American scholar to comment
that "the populist, from-the-masses-to-the-masses, procedure-be-damned Ma
Xiwu style is definitely making a rhetorical comeback." 7'
In the SPC's third five-year legal reform plan, issued in 2009, "resolutely
follow the mass line" (M 9A k) (jianchi qunzhong luxian) became a
central principle of judicial reform, requiring courts to accommodate public
opinion and "willingly accept the review and inspection by the people., 72
Meanwhile, the SPC continued to promote mediation as the default dispute-
resolution procedure in civil cases. This led to a steady increase in the
percentage of civil cases resolved via mediation or withdrawal-65.3% in 2010,
up from 55% in 2 oo6. Highlighting the importance of mediation in the SPC's
68 See supra notes io, ii.
69 Wang Shengjun (Tfjl-), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao (2009) (fi-pi)
- [2009]) [Supreme People's Court Work Report (2009)], STANDING COMM.
NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz., Apr. 1, 2009, at 339 [hereinafter Wang, SPC Work Report
2009], available at http://www.gov.cn/2ooglh/content126iioi.htm (delivered at the 2d
plenary session of the lath National People's Congress on Mar. io, 2009); Bai Long (0t
t), Wang Shengjun Yaoqiu Ganjing Xuexi Ma Xiwu Zuo Yi Xin Weimin de "Pingmin
Faguan" (-I1tF9 * -J--i -btC K M"FR' ") [Wang Shengjun
Demands that Policemen Learn from Ma Xiwu and Become "Commoner Judges" that
Only Serve the People], Renmin Ribao (A R RE ) [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Aug. 8, 2009i,
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/fztd/sfgz/2oo9-o8/o8/content 5128 4 7 .
htm; Wang Ye (EOP), Ma Xiwu Shenpan Fangshi Zhanting zai Gansu Luocheng (-
Ti-EMJAR) [The Exhibit Hall of the Ma Xiwu Adjudication Method
Opens in Gansu], Zhongguo Fayuan Wang (rNiM9VA) [CHINA COURTS NET] (Jan. 22,
2oo9, 8:14 AM), http://www.court.gov.cn/news/bulletin/release/200 90122000 4 .htm.
7 0 Wang, SPC Work Report 2009, supra note 69.
' Donald C. Clarke, Supreme People's Court Work Report: Comments, CHINESE L. PROF
BLOG (Apr. 9, 2009), http://iawprofessors.typepad.com/china-law-prof blog/2009/o4/
supreme-peoples-court-work-report.html.
71 Renmin Fayuan Di San Ge Wu Nian Gaige Ganyao (2009-2013) (AK~ i -i'
k-M [2oo9-2o3]) [The Third Five-Year Reform Plan for the People's Courts (2009-
2013)] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Mar. 17, 2009, effective Mar. 17, 2009) SuP.
PEOPLE'S CT. GAz., May 1, 2oo9, at 16 [hereinafter Third Five-Year Plan], available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show.php?file-id=1 34 4 21.
Wang Shengjun (I{ ), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Baogao (2011) (I&Xi i;_fN
" [2o]) [Supreme People's Court Work Report (2011)], STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S
CONG., Apr. 15, 2011, at 341 [hereinafter Wang, SPC Work Report 2011], available at
http://www.gov.cn/zoilh/content-1827715.htm (delivered at the 4th plenary session of
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policy agenda, Wang argued that implementing the "Three Supremes" requires
courts to "understand people's needs in a timely fashion and adjust judicial
policy accordingly," and that promotion of mediation and "anjie shiliao" are
keys to doing so."
Mediation is, of course, but one aspect of the SPC's "populist turn." The
promotion of "the mass line" naturally requires courts to establish and
maintain avenues for the public to voice their concerns and demands, as SPC
reform agendas have clearly emphasized.75 Wang has even suggested that
judicial decisions in capital punishment cases should consider "the feelings of
the masses," and that judicial reforms should generally accept the inspection
of the media.76 Other changes include ongoing implementation of the 2003
"justice for the people" agenda: increasing case processing efficiency, requiring
judges to provide procedural guidance to litigants, reducing litigation fees, and
so on.,n
In addition to promoting responsiveness to public opinion and interests,
the SPC has also stressed the importance of accepting the "supremacy of the
Party" and cooperating with other government? 8 The Third Five-Year Plan, for
example, states that legal reform measures should "resolutely follow the
leadership of the Party" and "accept the supervision of the people's
congresses," so as to protect the "constitutional status and judicial authority"
of the courts. 9 In comparison, the previous five-year plan contained no such
language.80
Unlike the wide-ranging but fairly visible consequences of the "populist
turn," it is difficult to credit any actual changes in SPC policy to the emergence
of the "First Supreme." Courts have never' strayed far from the Party's control,
the iith National People's Congress on Mar. 11, 2011); Liebman, supra note 2, at 18 (citing
LAwY.B. CHINA 2007, at io66).
74 Wang, supra note io.
75 Third Five-Year Plan, supra note 72, at §§ 2-25 to 2-30.
76 Qin Xudong (4,)L7T), Zuigao Fayuan Yuanzhang Tan Sixing Yiju Yinfa Zhengyi (ui1i
miR-.iA t]mmi -a4,y) [The President of the Supreme People's Court's
Discussion of the Basis for Capital Punishment Stirs Up Controversy], Caijing Wang (Q4-
F)]) [CAIJING] (Apr. 11, 2oo8, 3:15 PM), http://www.caijing.com.cn/2oo8o4ll/56o61.
shtml.
7 Twenty-Three Measures for Implementing Justice, supra note 59.
78 See Wang, supra note io.
7' Third Five-Year Plan, supra note 72.
8o Renmin Fayuan Di Er Ge Wu Nian Gaige Ganyao (2005-2008) (A 41-+
E:k* [2005-2008]) [The Second Five-Year Reform Plan for the People's Courts
(2005-20o8)] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Oct. 26, 2005, effective Oct. 26,
2005) Sup. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ., Dec. 1o, 2005, at 8 [hereinafter Second Five-Year Plan],
available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law-view.asp?id=12o832.
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and so perhaps there is little to change except the rhetoric. The judiciary's
gradual development of legal professionalism almost certainly received Party
approval. In fact, it fits in very well with the "rule the country according to
law" (fM ) (yifa zhiguo) rhetoric that the Party-state has trumpeted for
over a decade.' While the Qi Yuling case did veer away from established
political conventions and might have expanded judicial authority beyond what
Party leaders were comfortable with, such cases have always been the
extremely rare exception.
8 2
The latest turn in the Qi Yuling saga, however, suggests that the Party has
indeed strengthened its control over the judiciary. On December 18, 2008, in a
batch of twenty-seven judicial interpretations declared invalid, the SPC quietly
threw out Qi Yuling by simply stating that it "no longer applied."s Scholars
hastened to comment, generally arguing that the decision was a combination
of external pressure and the self-interest of the new SPC leadership.8 ' As a
prominent Chinese constitutional law scholar stated: "[The abolishment of Qi
Yuling] indicates that the political leadership ... recognized that allowing the
courts a direct role in the enforcement of the Constitution would undermine
China's political structure... For the new leadership of the Supreme Court, the
Reply to Qi Yuling's Case represented a political burden .... .5 Others
observed that, "despite the SPC's best efforts to avoid crossing any political
lines [in Qi Yuling], the response from above was negative."8 6
At the same time, the SPC has sustained its promotion of legal
professionalism and judicial independence. The Third Five-Year Plan calls for
8 See Xiao Yang ( i), Yifa Zhiguo Jiben Fangzhen de Tichu, Xingcheng, he Fazhan
( Mi421*:JrJ I%, t1hz, *1IR) [The Proposal, Formation, and Development of
the,"Rule the Country According to Law" Directive], * [Qiu SHI], no. 20, 2007, at 18,
available at http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2007/200720/2009 07 /t2oo 9o7o7 -67 83 .htm.
82 Kellogg, supra note 53, at 245 (noting that, although judicial activists have made
numerous constitutional arguments in cases, the courts and the government generally
do not respond to them).
83 Guanyu Feizhi 2007 Nian Di Yiqian Fabu de Youguan Sifa Jieshi (Di Qi Pi) de Jueding
( fA 2007 IftMI 4 M IM ] T) [The Decision
Concerning the Abolishment of Judicial Interpretations Issued Before the End of 2007
(7 th Batch)] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 8, 2oo8, effective Dec. 24, 2oo8)
§ 26, SuP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ., Feb. 1, 2009, at 7, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/
html/article/2oo82/24/337i61.shtml.
84 See Tong, supra note 26, at io9; Clarke, supra note 56 ("An interesting political
question: is this part of an attack on Xiao Yang, which has seen him rumored,
apparently falsely, to have been put under shuanggui [Party disciplinary detention] on
suspicion of corruption, and may be connected with the downfall of Huang Songyou, a
former SPC vice president, on corruption charges?").
85 Tong, supra note 26, at 677.
86 Thomas E. Kellogg, The Death of Constitutional Litigation in China?, CHINA BRIEF, Apr.
2, 2oo9, at 5, available at http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb-oog_7_o2.pdf.
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leadership of the Party and a promotion of the "mass line," but also stresses
that judges should continue to advance their level of professional training and
that courts should strengthen their ability to "independently and fairly
exercise their power of adjudication.8a While the judiciary is certainly familiar
with the academic convention that populism may be incompatible with legal
professionalism and judicial independence, it has been content to place these
ideals side-by-side and, perhaps, hoping for a workable balance to emerge in
practice.8 Scholars therefore observe that the judiciary is characterized by
"tension between trends toward professionalism and populism." 9 The
heightened degree of political control by the Party is, of course, an "external
limiting condition" that no one ignores.
Existing scholarship on the rise of legal populism and "Party supremacy"
in recent SPC policy has generally done a better job of tracing these
developments and debating their normative merits than explaining their
underlying causes. While the increase in Party control is not terribly
surprising-it is only natural for an authoritarian state to desire strong control
over its legal apparatus-motivations behind the promotion of legal populism
are not well understood. Chinese scholars and lawyers have rarely attempted
to pry into the SPC's "original intent," perhaps concerned with the political
sensitiveness of the issue.90 Western scholars, in contrast, are limited by their
small numbers. Liebman's "populism" paper was essentially the first American
piece to systematically examine the "populist turn," and thus understandably
focused more on the "how" than the "why."9' It identified a few potential
underlying motives but expends little energy in evaluating their relative
87 Third Five-Year Plan, supra note 72, at § 2-10.
See Yi Dao San (-JED, Ye Tan Sifa de Dazhonghua yu Faguan de Zhiyehua (P- iJ
8 M t ft 1 - ' 1 I V R% ft) [Another Analysis of Judicial Populism and the
Professionalization of Judges], Falui Boke (' iTtM) [LEGAL BLOGS] (Aug. 28, 2oo8, 3:26
PM), http://heweifang.fyfz.cn/art/379o89.htm; Qiao Bei Ma (*At4), Ye Tan Sifa
Zhiyehua yu Dazhonghua (1ii _]k{- k/z(t) [Another Analysis of Judicial
Professionalization and Populization], Ninbo Falui Wang (PiiA*M) [NINGBO L. NET]
(Oct. 16, 2OO8), http://www.eccfy.com/fxyt/ShowArticle.asp?ArticlelD=4239; He
Weifang, Ma Huaide & He Bing ( 171, 4-'i & PJ,), Sifa Gaige de Lujing: Sifa de
Zhiyehua yu Sifa de Minzhuhua (I- l -WT{: lo 1 IRft-'8 (It)
[Paths of Judicial Reform: Judicial Professionalization and Judicial Democratization],
CHINALAWINFO, http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleHtml/Article_28003.shtml (last
visited Jan. 27, 2012).
89 Liebman, supra note 2, at 1, 7.
9 Tong, supra note 26, is one of the extremely rare exceptions and, it must be noted,
was published in an American law journal, rather than in China.
9" Liebman, supra note 2, at 9-23.
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importance, perhaps leaving those issues for future research.9" Few scholars
have followed up on them.9 3
From the SPC's point of view, there are three possible kinds of
motivations, logically distinct but nonetheless capable of coexistence. First, it
may simply be carrying out orders. The Party-state decides that legal populism
is desirable and demands that the judiciary follows suit. The purest version of
this theory would deny the judiciary any substantial agency in forming the
populist reform agenda, although that is certainly an exaggeration. Second, the
SPC, or at least much of its leadership, may have genuinely internalized
populism as a guiding principle of legal reform. For whatever reason-
ideology, tradition, or other factors-populism possesses normative, even
moral, value, and simply deserves to be promoted. Third, the SPC may possess
pragmatic ulterior motives: strengthening its finances, boosting its public
reputation, or avoiding public or political controversy. Basically, this theory
sees the SPC as a "rational actor" that pursues its institutional self-interest.
This brings up the preliminary point of whether the SPC is a consolidated
institution that possesses coherent "self-interests" and is somewhat capable of
advancing them. Given the strict bureaucratic hierarchy within the SPC, it is,
at the very least, an organized institution with a fairly clear system of
command.94 Because the sociopolitical standing of SPC leaders are directly
related to that of the judiciary, one would imagine that they have strong
personal incentives to protect and enhance its political standing, social
reputation, and financial health. Moreover, as stated above, the judiciary
currently handles a legal apparatus far too complex in both legal and
administrative dimensions for external political forces to directly dictate every
substantive SPC decision. 95 We may therefore assume that the SPC possesses
significant agency in developing and implementing judicial reform agendas.
Certainly its leaders generally wish to please Party superiors, but they at least
have considerable discretion in choosing how to do that.
Liebman's paper touches upon all three theories but also seems to
emphasize the second and third over the first, and the second in particular. It
highlights the "historical continuities" between the SPC's current promotion of
populism and precedents set in the Ma Xiwu era, suggesting that there is a
Chinese Communist "legal tradition" that guides and encourages recent
developments. 96 This suggests a fairly normative interpretation of the
"populist turn": by and large, the Chinese judiciary is simply connecting to its
own normative traditions, which do not conform to Western notions of legal
9 Id. at 24-27.
9 1 find only three articles that explicitly attempt to explain why the "populist turn"
occurred: Minzner, supra note 4; Zang, supra note 12; Peerenboom, supra note 12.
94 See Finder, supra note 2; PEERENBOOM, supra note 2.
95 See discussion surrounding supra notes 16-18.
96 Liebman, supra note 2, at 24-27.
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professionalism. 97 Yet, Liebman also acknowledges that the promotion of
populism "may in significant part consist of using revolutionary language to
pursue divergent and diffuse goals," including "show[ing] courts' loyalty to
Party leadership," "protect[ing] courts from criticism," and "facilitat[ing]
innovation."98 Populism can, therefore, become a "tool for legal institutions to
promote their own authority and legitimacy."99 The paper does not elaborate
further.
Other studies of the Wang Shengjun Court have come down more firmly
on the side of one specific theory. Based on a close reading of the SPC's Third
Five-Year Plan, Randall Peerenboom argues that the Court's judicial reform
agenda "reflects a pragmatic political compromise. The court accepts some
limits on its powers and refrains from challenging other organs in exchange for
cooperation on certain issues that enhance the judiciary's power and
authority."'0 0 One wonders, however, if an analysis of only the Third Five-Year
Plan can adequately support a broad thesis of institutional pragmatism.
Zang Dongsheng has suggested a more pessimistic view: populism derives
directly from the Party's conviction that "the legal profession must be brought
under control, repeatedly."'"' His paper therefore straightforwardly applies the
second theory but provides little analysis of actual SPC policy. A recent article
by Carl Minzner likewise sees the Court's "populist turn" as directly derivative
of a broader "turn against law" that permeates the entire Chinese Party-state.'
0 2
Minzner argues, correctly, that Party leaders have deemphasized formal legal
procedure largely as a pragmatic response to growing social unrest.' 3 Like any
other government organ, the SPC has simply been implementing these
directives. Examining the conflict between "mediatory" and "adjudicatory"
justice in the later Xiao Yang years, Fu Hualing and Richard Cullen also argue
that the reemphasis on mediation is due to pressure from the Party
leadership.' a While these observations are accurate to some extent, they
overlook, as argued both above and below, the SPC's substantial agency in
judicial policy-making.
To provide a deeper analysis of the institutional intent behind recent SPC
policy-making, this Article places the SPC's "populist turn" within a broader
I d. at 25-26.
98 Id. at 24.
99 Id. at 15.
'oo Peerenboom, supra note 12, at 9.
'o, Zang, supra note 12, at 93.
'02 Minzner, supra note 4.
103 Id. at 19-20 (explaining the "turn against law" by emphasizing the Party-state's
overall short-term policy concerns, including limiting social unrest and bringing the
judiciary back under closer surveillance).
104 Fu & Cullen, supra note 6, at 54-66.
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context of judicial activity. Although academic studies of SPC policy have
predominantly focused on developments related to legal professionalism,
populism, or Party control, many of the SPC's most important and visible
recent actions are largely unrelated-and indeed often contradictory-to these
factors. Instead, they were designed to conserve the judiciary's financial or
human resources, avoid engagement with potentially controversial issues, and
strengthen the SPC's powers of judicial interpretation. The deep institutional
pragmatism underlying these actions strongly suggests that we reconsider, at
least partially, the SPC's promotion of both legal populism and professionalism
as strategic moves designed to enhance its sociopolitical standing. There is no
denying that SPC judges are fully capable of internalizing one, or even both, of
these ideologies, but one wonders if the SPC would have taken these steps
without the lure of potential institutional benefits. I argue that the SPC has
been, and will probably continue to be, a rational institutional actor that
largely pursues its self-interest.
II. CASE STUDIES OF INSTITUTIONAL PRAGMATISM
This Part examines some of the SPC's most significant legal reform
projects and judicial interpretations of the past two years, including changes in
legal procedure, substantive law, and the Court's institutional authority. It
argues that the straightforward pursuit of institutional self-interest is a far
more persuasive explanation for these activities than external political
pressure or ideological commitment to either professionalism or populism.
A. "Judicial Cost and Efficiency"
Within the SPC's current work agenda, the phrase "judicial cost and
efficiency" generally refers to a specific ongoing project undertaken by the
SPC's Institute for Applied Legal Studies (IALS) and sponsored by both the
European Union and the United Nations Development Programme.' ° This
project is but one part of a broader SPC initiative to streamline case processing
and prevent the buildup of docket backlogs. Like other developments
"' There is a brief description of the project at the start of Gu Lijun (QPOlJW), "Sifa
Xiaola" Zhuanlan: Heli Fendan Chengben, Quanmian Tisheng Sifa Xiaoliu (" 1 4'"
-V t : V 3 1-] 9 M *, i fi V ft - M A *) [A Special Column on "Judicial
Efficiency"* Distribute judicial Costs Reasonably, and Comprehensively Improve Judicial
Efficiency], Renmin Fayuan Bao (Ai~kIR) [PEOPLE'S CT. DAILY], Dec. 8, 2oo, at 5,
available at http://www.court.gov.cn/fxyj/yjcgzs/2o11o 3/t2olo 3o 4 _15537.html, and also
at Jiang Huiling (d), Sifa Xiaolu yu Sifa Chengben de Goucheng (1'k* -M
A*M fjA)) [The Formation of Judicial EJficiency and Judicial Cost], Renmin Fayuan
Bao (ARMKIR) [PEOPLE'S CT. DAILY], Dec. 1, 201o, at 8, available at http://www.
court.gov.cn/fxyj/yjcgzs/201103/t2o1o3o41 5530.html.
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discussed above, this initiative has roots in the Xiao Yang era but noticeably
intensified after 2008. It traces its rhetorical origins to a 2000 speech by Xiao
Yang, which stated that "fairness and efficiency" would be the main themes of
legal reform in the new century. °6 When Xiao put forth the "justice for the
people" slogan three years later, he explained that the slogan represented the
foundation and starting point of "fairness and efficiency" and, therefore, that
the two slogans were fundamentally interconnected."°7 One might see, for
example, the various "access to justice" reforms discussed above also as
attempts to boost judicial efficiency-once litigants were better informed, they
probably would make better decisions and move the legal process along faster.
The most important measure in this "judicial efficiency" initiative so far
has been the enhanced application of "summary procedure" in civil and
criminal trials.oS In 2003, the SPC issued an opinion on the application of such
procedures in civil cases, while co-authoring, at roughly the same time, a
separate opinion on criminal cases with the Supreme People's Procuratorate
and Ministry of Justice. ° 9 While both civil and criminal procedure laws had
recognized summary procedures since the mid-199os, the statutory language
was vague and hard to apply."' As Huang Songyou explained, by providing
w6 Zong Bian (,ii), Xiao Yang zai Bajisitan Fabiao Yanjiang: Weihu Sifa Gongzheng,
T iga o S ifa X ia olI i ( P 1 E41 .R K A 0 : -4 4PIP A E, rt j'M _i [X Via o
Yang Speaks in Pakistan: Protect Judicial Fairness, Enhance Judicial Efficiency], Renmin
Fayuan Bao (A K M K 49 ) [PEOPLE'S CT. DAILY], June 19, 2OO, available at
http://oldfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=24975.
"07 Fan & Li, supra note 59.
,08 SPC higher-ups have explicitly stated this. Jiang Huiling, supra note 105. Some
scholars have identified other measures in the efficiency program, including
administrative emphasis on statutory deadlines for normal civil procedure, annual
case-completion rates, and appeals rates for local adjudication. See Fu & Cullen, supra
note 6, at 46-49. These measures focus, however, only on the handling of regular civil
procedure, and are therefore less drastic "efficiency" measures than the push for
summary procedure discussed here.
to9 Guanyu Shiyong Jianyi Chengxu Shenli Minshi Anjian de Ruogan Guiding ( -Jf]
01j A O M. $ -1WJfi) [Several Regulations Concerning the Application of
Summary Procedure to Civil Cases] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Sept. io,
2003, effective Dec. 1, 2003) SUp. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ., May 1, 2003, at 9 [hereinafter
Application of Summary Procedure to Civil Cases], available at http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law..view.asp?id=8o973; Guanyu Shiyong Jianyi Chengxu Shenli Gongsu
Anjian de Ruogan Guiding (+ M*-# _l ' I) [Several
Regulations Concerning the Application of Summary Procedure to Criminal Cases]
(promulgated by Sup. People's Ct., Sup. People's Proc., and Ministry of Justice, Mar. 14,
2003, effective Mar. 14, 2003), SuP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ., Feb. 1, 2003, at 21 [hereinafter
Application of Summary Procedure to Criminal Cases], available at http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law-view.asp?id=42942.
",0 Minshi Susong Fa (L&-iizi'I ) [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991, amended Apr. 1,
2008) §§ 142-146, 1991 SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ. 3 [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law of 19911
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detailed guidelines on when and how to apply summary procedure, the
opinions enhanced its availability to litigants."'
The primary difference between summary and regular civil procedure was
that the former must generally conclude within three months, whereas the
latter could take six."12 To this end, summary procedure generally allowed for
only one hearing before judgment, excluded the use of three-judge
adjudication panels, and relaxed certain procedural requirements for motion
filing, evidence presentation, and debate. "3 The application of summary
procedure in criminal cases had largely similar effects, but it placed the
deadline for case conclusion at twenty days. "4 There were, of course,
restrictions on when summary procedure could be used. In civil cases, both
sides needed to consent to the procedure and agree on the basic facts."' In
criminal cases, summary procedure required the consent of the prosecutor, a
"simple and clear" fact pattern, a guilty plea, and a charge that carried no more
than three years imprisonment."6
There is nothing controversial about these rules. Taken at face value, they
provide the option of simplifying trial procedure when there is little factual
ambiguity. For most of the 2000S, there was no indication that judges were
applying summary procedure unfairly or coercively. Indeed, application of
summary procedure by local courts increased only modestly after 2003."'
Xingshi Susong Fa (Jf ,t) [Criminal Procedure Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective Mar. 17, 1996), §§
174-179, 1996 SuP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ. 39 [hereinafter Criminal Procedure Law of 19961.
.. Tian Yu (H1lI), Zuigao Fayuan Gongbu Minshi Anjian Shiyong Jianyi Chengxu Sifa
Jieshi (- Mu$) [The Supreme Court Issues a
Judicial Interpretation Concerning the Application of Summary Procedure to Civil Cases],
Xinhua Wang (Or*R) [XINiHUA NET] (Sept. 19, 2003, 10:04 PM), http://news.xinhuanet
.com/newscenter/2003-09/18/content 1o88684.htm.
Civil Procedure Law of 1991, supra note no, at §§ 135, 146. These were the statutory
rules in effect at the time of the SPC interpretations on summary procedure, which
were later replaced in 2oo8-with no change to the time limits-by the 2oo8
amendments to the Civil Procedure Law. Minshi Susong Fa ( - i i ) [Civil
Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 28,
2007, effective Apr. 1, 2008) §§ 135, 146, 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ.
702.
"13 Civil Procedure Law of 1991, supra note io, at §§ 143-145; Application of Summary
Procedure to Civil Cases, supra note 109, at §§ 4-12, 21, 23, 27.
"' Criminal Procedure Law of 1991, supra note no, at §§ 147-149, 178; Application of
Summary Procedure to Criminal Cases, supra note lo9, at §§ 5, 7.
"' Application of Summary Procedure to Civil Cases, supra note 1O9,.at § 1.
n6 Application of Summary Procedure to Criminal Cases, supra note 1o9, at § 1.
117 According to Tian Yu & Zhang Xiaojing (1U M,, & KHn), Quanguo Jiceng Fayuan 6o%
Anjian Shiyong Jianyi Chengxu Kuai Shen Kuai Pan (i IN- MM 6o%_ 1tffl I A n
28 Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2o12)
In 2oo8, however, the SPC began to increase pressure on local courts to
apply summary procedure as often as possible. Early that year, it issued an
experimental set of guidelines designed to formalize the internal review of
judicial performance."' Most prominently, the guidelines laid out thirty-three
statistical "indicators" that lower courts should use to evaluate and guide the
work performance of their judges-basically, establishing "target levels" for
each statistic and rewarding or reprimanding judges, often financially, based
on their success or failure at meeting those targets."9 These included not only
indicators on the percentage of cases appealed, overturned, mediated, and
withdrawn, but also eleven indicators of "judicial efficiency" that look at, for
example, the percentage of cases closed within proper time limits, the average
duration of each case, and the percentage of cases that used summary
procedure.2 0
The SPC then solidified these "experimental" measures in 20o by
establishing an annual national review procedure, in which all lower courts
received evaluations and rankings based on statistical indicators.' These
evaluations introduced a mathematical formula based on twenty-six
indicators-the other seven were presumably eliminated-and assigned
"weights" to each indicator.' This provided a statistical foundation for
M)0i1":J) [6o% of Cases in Local Courts Applied Summary Procedure to Adjudicate
Swiftly], Zhongguo Falii Jiaoyu Wang ( [CHINA LEGAL EDUC. NET] (July 2,
2004), http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/1ooo/ 3 /2004/7/heo8 34 24 3834 12740021568 4 2
_121965.htm, 6o% of local cases applied summary procedure, including both civil and
criminal cases. This meant that well over 6o% of civil cases applied summary procedure,
as the rate is generally much lower for criminal cases-according to Xiao Yang (A A),
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao (2007) (0&A& R -T ',I{ :T [2007])
[Supreme People's Court Work Report (2007)], STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG.
GAZ., Mar. 30, 2007, at 370 [hereinafter Xiao, SPC Work Report 2007], available at
http://www.gov.cn/2oo71h/content556959.htm (delivered at the 5th plenary session of
the ioth National People's Congress on Mar. 13, 2007), the application rates had
"increased" to around 70% for civil cases and around 40% for criminal cases. The
increase must have been marginal.
11s Guanyu Kaizhan Anjian Zhiliang Pingbu Gongzuo de Zhidao Yijian (Shixing) (A-f f
]) Rif _T.1'P M.14V [5 ]) [Guiding Opinion on the Initiation of Case
Quality Evaluations (Trial Implementation)] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Jan.
n1, 2oo8, effective Jan. 11, 20o8), SuP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ., Mar. 1, 2oo8, at 13, available at
http://china.findlaw.cn/info/minshang/minfa/minfafagui/sifajieshi/62 500.html.
"9 Id. at §§ 8-1o.
120 id.
'
21 Jiedu Zuigao Fayuan "26 Xiang Zhibiao" (Vi-k~i'i"26 XIM'H") [Interpreting the
"26 Indicators" Issued by the Supreme Court], Shijiazhuang Shi Yuhua Qu Renmin
Fayuan Wang (f R-4 r x: A , RM K- M ) [PEOPLE'S CT. OF YUHUA DISTRICT,
SHIJIAZHUANG NET], http://www.yhqfy.com/show.asp?id=17 8 (last visited Dec. 24, 2011).
122 Id.
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national rankings and comparisons. Within this new system, the percentage of
cases that applied summary procedure and the percentage that issued verdicts
immediately after the initial hearing occupied counterintuitively heavy
weights: 8% and 6%, respectively, of the total "score."23 By comparison, the
percentage of cases appealed and overturned each only weighed 3%.'" And
despite the public exposure that mediation and "justice for the people" have
recently received, the percentage of cases mediated only weighed 5%. '125 The
introduction of this review system triggered a flurry of action in lower courts,
as administrators scrambled to put together appropriate "target levels" for the
designated indicators, conduct internal reviews, and boost corresponding
performance levels.126
Although lower courts had long used a variety of statistical indicators to
measure judicial performance, prior to 2oo8, the SPC had rarely explicitly
endorsed the establishment of what some have called "target responsibility
systems. ' 12 7 Quite the opposite, in the late 199os and early 2000S, it would
sometimes caution lower courts against abuse of performance indicators "in
violation of judicial fairness. ''I2s Moreover, even among lower courts, the use of
summary procedure was rarely emphasized as a key measure of positive
performance, unlike, for example, the percentage of cases adjudicated in court
or, since at least 2003, the percentage of cases mediated.'29
By designating the application of summary procedure as a key measure of
judicial performance, the SPC created significant pressure on local courts to
simplify case processing whenever possible. A relatively benign interpretation
of these developments would be that they were simply rational reactions to
some pressing necessity: perhaps many cases that followed regular procedure
were actually too simple to justify it. It seems unclear, however, whether the
SPC actually has any real grounds to make this assessment. Due to the limited
availability of judicial appeal in China, the SPC relies predominantly on
research projects to monitor local adjudication, but there has apparently been






127 Carl F. Minzner, Riots and Cover-Ups: Counterproductive Control of Local Agents in
China, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L. L. 53 (2009).
,28 See sources cited at supra note 63; Fu & Cullen, supra note 6, at 49-51 (noting how
the SPC "was critical" of certain statistical performance indicators and was "challenging"
their use).
129 Minzner, supra note 4, at 33-34.
130 Email from the research staff of Institute of Applied Legal Studies (March 1, 2011, 4:10
EST) (on file with author).
30 Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2012)
As far as prima facie evidence goes, a 70% application rate in civil cases
and a 40% rate in criminal trials hardly seem low.'3' These rates arguably
reflect a considerable effort by judges-who have their own incentive to
lighten their workload-to encourage simplified procedure. A few Chinese
scholars and judges have attempted to compare these numbers to the use of
simplified legal procedures in Western courts, arguing that Chinese usage of
summary procedure is dramatically lower than in "developed countries. ' 132
These discussions, however, come with little academic rigor: one paper even
compares the use of summary procedure in criminal cases to American plea-
bargaining.'33 If one only looks at the average length of cases, i.e., the time
between the initial filing of claims to the final conclusion, then Chinese courts
actually compare favorably to most Western jurisdictions. Moreover,
according to a 2002 study by the World Bank, Chinese processing of civil
claims was faster than nearly all Western European nations even before the
2003 SPC opinion encouraging the use of summary procedure, with the
exception being the United Kingdom.TM In the end, there does not seem to be
much reason for the SPC to believe that regular trial procedures were being
used "wastefully."
Alternatively, the SPC might have believed that the total volume of
litigation in China was rising too rapidly for local courts to continue applying
regular procedure as often as they used to. Chinese judges have regularly
complained about rising caseloads for years.'3 5 Prior to 2007, the total caseload
131 See supra note 117.
132 E.g., Song Zhaowu (MA ), Minshi Susong Jianyi Chengxu Bijiao Yanjiu (K ifi
0 EM-U: Lt) [A Comparative Study of Civil Summary Procedures], Renmin Sifa
( A K I M) [People's Judicature], no. 8, 2003, at 62, available at http://www.
civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=51454; Xie Xiaojian (i*/],'Jy), Bijiao Fa Shiye xia
de Xingshi Jianyi Chengxu (Lt M MTI IJ UF ) [Summary Criminal
Procedure Under a Comparative Law Perspective], Jiangxi Caijing Daxue Xuebao (WIN
- I- ) [J. JIANGXI UNIv. FIN. & ECON., no. 1, zoo8, at 97; Wang Guoshu & Xiang
Zhenhua (qzE & J _4 ), Zhongwai Xingshi Susong Jianyi Chengxu ji Bijiao (4' +f7'J
i _ [A Comparison of Summary Criminal Procedures in China and
Foreign Jurisdictions], Zhongguo Faxue (cP [ -_) [CHINA LEGAL Sci.], no. 3, 1999, at 143.
,33 Xie, supra note 132.
134 Simeon Danjkov et al., Courts: The Lex Mundi Project, 48-51 (National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 8890, zooz), available at http://www.lexmundi
.com/images/lexmundi/PDF/courts-nberi.pdf'?SnlD=2 (comparing the processing
speed of basic civil disputes across different nations).
135 Liebman, supra note 5, at 4-5; Yan Maokun (fia R), Xiao Yang zai Meiguo Yelu
Daxue Fabiao Yanjiang Zhongguo Sifa: Tiaozhan yu Gaige -
iW.: - [Xiao Yang Gives Speech at Yale University on China's
Judiciary: Challenges and Reforms], Renmin Fayuan Bao (AMR4I9) [PEOPLE'S CT.
DAILY], Oct.12, 2004, at 1-2, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/2oo41o
/12/1 34 38i.shtml; Sun Huili (4WEN), Beijing Susong Shuliang Baozhashi Zengchang
Qunian 76% Anjian Weineng Jiean (1,, i t-K - 76°, 14l#)
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of the Chinese judiciary had hovered consistently at around 8 million cases for
over five years. 136 This jumped to around 9 million in 2007, io million in 20o8,
and finally ni million in 2009. In 2010, however, the trend reversed, with the
total number of cases falling slightly. 3
Nonetheless, a rising volume of litigation does not mean that Chinese
courts are overstretched. Even in 2009, the average Chinese trial judge
handled less than ninty cases a year. 3 Considering that it actually takes less
time to process a case in China than in most Western nations, this figure
seems relatively low: American trial judges routinely handle more than 400
cases a year, as do German criminal judges-German civil judges often take
around 70o. 39 Comparisons to other Asian jurisdictions are even starker:
South Korean judges process over 700 cases each year, and Taiwanese civil
[The Number of Cases in Beijing Increases Explosively, the Percentage of Not Closed
Cases Increased by 76% Last Year], Fazhi Wanbao ('M$1J1AJ.) [BEIJING LEGAL TIMES]
(Apr. 27, 2005, 4:5oPM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-o4/27/content-
288463 6.htm.
136 Liebman, supra note 5, at 6-7.
" Wang, SPC Work Report 2011, supra note 73; Wang Shengjun (TE{-), Zuigao
Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao (2010) ( ,hA i[I44 " [2010]) [Supreme
People's Court Work Report (2010)], STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ., Apr. i,
2oo, at 307, available at http://www.dffy.com/sifashijian/ziliao/2oloo3 /
2ooo3i1634o8.htm (delivered at the 3d plenary session of the nth National People's
Congress on Mar. 11, 201O); Wang, SPC Work Report 2009, supra note 69; Xiao Yang (f
I ), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao (2008) ( [2008])
[Supreme People's Court Work Report (2oo8)], STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG.
GAz., Mar. 31, 2oo8, at 370, available at http://www.gov.cn/2oo8lh/content_926i9i.htm
(delivered at the first plenary session of the ith National People's Congress on Mar. io,
2oo8).
138 Kui Kui (A), Zhongguo Faguan de Renjun Jiean Shu Weishime Ruci Di? (1P [M't"
M. [Why Is the Average Caseload of Chinese Judges So Low?],
Zhang Jianbi Liishi Boke ( 'j 4l ) [LAWYER ZHANG JIANBI'S BLOG] (Jan. 28, 2o,
2:57 PM), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog-6b96bec8olooo12c.html; Kui Kui (I),
Guowai Faguan Meinian Keyi Chuli Duoshao Jian Anjian? (
#,*#?) [How Many Cases Can Foreign Judges Process Each Year?], Dongfang Fayan
( -,I,: l MR) [E. LEGAL PERSP.] (Oct. 11, 2010, 3:01 PM), http://www.dffy.com/
faxuejieti/zh/2olol/2o1111115 o2o2.htm; Liu Juanjuan ('ijf4A), Sifa Xiaolii yu Faguan
Yuan E Zhidu zhi Bijiao Zhongsu ( ' -,J [Comparison
and Reconstruction of Judicial Efficiency and Court Personnel Quota System], Shanghai
Fayuan Wang (+ifWPM) [SHANGHAI CT. NET] (Apr. 18, zoo5), http://www.hshfy.
sh.cn/shfy/gweb/xxnr.jsp?pa=aaWQ9MjgoNDEmeGg 9 MQPdcssPdcssz.
139 Liu, supra note 138.
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judges often receive over 2000 cases.'40 Certainly, the distribution of cases
among Chinese local courts is highly uneven, but even the busiest courts only
receive around 140 cases per judge.'4 ' These facts are fairly well-known, and
legal scholars have frequently called for the judiciary to downsize, claiming
that Chinese judges are severely underworked.'"
Nor are there real grounds for the SPC to preemptively streamline judicial
procedure in anticipation of future growth: the 2o01 decline in caseload
suggest that the 2007-2009 increases were a short-term shock, not the start of
a long-term trend. The SPC itself seems to acknowledge this, blaming the
recent increases on "the global financial crisis" rather than China's long-term
economic growth.'43 Ultimately, the SPC has no good reason to aggressively
push for further simplification of judicial procedure, especially when it
potentially comes at the cost of fairness and accuracy.
Those costs could very well be hefty. In theory, litigants possess veto
power over the application of summary procedure,'" but one cannot help but
expect judges to encourage it much more aggressively now that the new
performance evaluation system looms constantly in the background. This is
already noticeable in many local courts.'4 5 By rewarding or punishing judges
140 Id.; Cao Shibing (-±4), An Duo Ren Shao de Hanguo Fayuan (A ,A .nl RM'
[R) [Overworked Courts in Korea], Renmin Sifa ( [PEOPLE'S JUDICIARY], no. i,
2009, at 59.
141 Kui Kui, Why is the Average Caseload of Chinese Judges So Low?, supra note 138.
142 Id. For a Western perspective on the extremely large size of the Chinese judiciary,
see Jerome A. Cohen, The Court of Mass Appeal, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 4, 2009,
at Al, available at http://www.cfr.org/china/court-mass-appeal/p19n7.
43 See sources at supra note 137.
'Application of Summary Procedure to Civil Cases, supra note lo9, at § 1 (requiring
consent from all litigants); Application of Summary Procedure to Criminal Cases, supra
note 1O9, at § i (requiring a voluntary guilty plea).
'4
5 A simple Google search for "1 _ 4U" (jianyi chengxu shiyong li) (application
rates for summary procedure) reveals that many local courts have recently stepped up
institutional measures to increase the usage of summary procedure, and often report-
with more than a hint of self-satisfaction-increasing rates. See, e.g., Tiaojie, Chesu
Zhan Jiean Zongshu Liu Cheng Jianyi Chengxu Shiyong Li Chaoguo 86% (ij- 9, Miff
, 86%) [Mediated and Withdrawn Cases Reach
6o%; Summary Procedure Applied in Over 86% of Cases], Wangyi Xinwen ( fi fflr)
[NETEASE NEWS] (Mar. 19, 2010, 5:o8 PM), http://news.163.com/1oo319/17/
625FBoKRo00 4 6BC.html (reporting statistics from Chongming District, Shanghai);
Quanshi Renmin Fating Jianyi Chengxu Shiyong Lu Da 85.3% ( i.l i)-fYA
tffl 4i 85.3%) [The Application of Summary Procedure in the Municipal People's
Courts Reaches 85.3%], Zhongguo Jiaxing (cP l ) [CHINA JIAXING] (June 3, 2010, 4:32
PM), http://www.jiaxing.gov.cn/art/zo1/6/3/art131_27846.html; Qianghua Guanli
Tigao Minshi Shenpan Gongzuo Zhiliang (3 WK - a R3 i - -V P _ I/P A #)
[Strengthen Management, Increase the Quality of Civil Adjudiciation], Jiutai Shi Renmin
Fayuan (I .' Ti A R M R) [JIUTAI CITY PEOPLE'S CT.] (Apr. 28, 2on, 8:46 PM),
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based on their summary procedure application rates, the evaluation system
will very likely create a "race to the top"-or "race to the bottom," depending
on one's point of view-to apply summary procedure. The potential for
coercion is enormous.' 6 Given the relative lack of legal representation in
China,'4 7 many litigants turn to court personnel for basic legal advice." s Judges
therefore wield tremendous influence over procedural choices. It is hardly far-
fetched to expect that many of them will now insistently recommend
procedural simplicity even when the case deserves a more drawn-out and
detailed treatment and that many, if not most, litigants will be in no position
to resist or even to fully comprehend the problem.
If the establishment of judicial performance indicators do not respond to
any pressing necessity, is it nonetheless possible that they derive from some
overarching ideological commitment, perhaps to either legal professionalism
or populism? This, too, seems unlikely. Putting strong institutional pressure
on judges to apply summary procedure is almost certainly inconsistent with
legal professionalism, especially when there is no decent evidence that
Chinese judges are overworked. Such pressure only prevents judges from
approaching the selection of procedure with an open mind, diverting their
attention from the accurate and appropriate application of legal rules.
Ironically, the performance indicators also run afoul of legal populism: they
intuitively make judges less sensitive, not more, to public opinion and the
specific needs of litigants. By giving judges substantial incentive to push for
http://jtfy.org/news/Show.php?id=33 5 ; Fengxian Fayuan 2009 Niandu Xianjin Qunti
Fengcai Lu (4.'I1 2009 , [Personal Profiles of Exemplary judges,
Fengxian Court, 2oo9], Shanghai Shi Fengxian Qu Renmin Fayuan (±4-*REX AR
MRI ) [SHANGHAI FENGXIAN DISTRICT CT.] Jan. 28, 2ou), http://www.fxfy.sh.cn/fxfyww/
pages/CzArticle/detail.do?articleld=1821 (praising certain judges for their high
summary procedure application rates).
146 Similar arguments have been made by Minzner, supra note 4, at 37-43, on the use of
"target responsibility systems" to promote mediation, but his major criticisms-
generally that it makes the choosing of procedural modes coercive and unresponsive to
popular social needs-also apply to the promotion of summary procedure via similar
methods.
147 See Zhang Zhiming ( Ka), Liishi de Shuliang yu Fenbu ( [The
Number and Distribution of Lawyers], Zhongguo LUishi Zhiye Falu Wang (4' l'lolfflA
"'fO) [CHINA LAWYERING L. NET] (Nov. 11, zoo6), http://www.china-lawyering.com/
main/list.asp?unid=1o21.
148 Courts are actually obligated to provide basic legal counsel to litigants, which
certainly reflects the judiciary's own grasp of the legal representation system: Guanyu
Jin Yi Bu Jiaqiang Sifa Bianmin Gongzuo de Ruogan Yijian (
f' J :f7JL) [Several Opinions Concerning the Provision of Convenient Justice to the
People] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct, Feb. 24, 2009, effective Feb. 24, 2009) § 1,
SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ., May 1, 2009, at 5, available at http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/
sfj/yj/201002/t200oo22 4 -19 o6.htm.
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summary procedure almost regardless of circumstance, the indicators
significantly damage the normative flexibility that legal populism so fervently
advocates.
Nor is it very plausible to view the indicators as the result of pressure from
Party leaders. It is hard to believe that they would have much interest in
exerting pressure on this kind of procedural detail. The push towards
summary procedure generates no clear benefit for either the Party-state's
control over the judiciary or for the maintenance of social stability. Quite the
opposite, it actually contradicts, as discussed above, the Party's vocal support
for the "justice for the people" initiative.
Having eliminated pressing necessity and ideological commitment, what is
left to explain the SPC's recent infatuation with summary procedure? However
theoretically pedestrian it may seem, the best explanation is simply the
pragmatic pursuit of institutional self-interest, most notably financial health.
Although the Chinese judiciary does not currently face any noticeable fiscal
deficit, it suffers from a limited budget and a strong financial dependence on
other branches of government.1 49 It therefore has a clear incentive to conserve
expenses, especially at a time of considerable financial uncertainty. Part of this
uncertainty stems from the broader financial problems of the Chinese state:
since at least the 2oo8 financial crisis, it has been running significant budget
deficits that some estimate to be over 15 percent of GDP in 2009.5' Amid
concerns about the housing market, high inflation, and "over-investment, '' 5'
the central government has planned to slow the expansion of government
debt, while local governments face even tougher fiscal decisions."2
149 See He, supra note 43; Wang Yaxin (TIR), Sifa Chengben yu Xifa Xiaoliu:
Zhongguo Fayuan de Caizheng Baozhang yu Faguan Jili (1& - -: 43 [E M
P, M -9"4 9 F) [Judicial Cost and Efficiency: The Securing of Finances and the
Motivation ofJudges in China's Courts], Faxuejia (&*-) [LEGAL SCHOLAR], no. 4, 2010,
at 132, available at http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=51198; Su Yongqin
( 77k ), Sifa Xingzheng Zuzhi de Fazhan Qushi: Cong Shenpan Duli yu Guojia Geifu
Sifa Yiwu de Jinzhang Guanxi Tan Qi ( VWJ MlA1-M '
4-,fkt),*A) [Development Trends in the Administrative Organization
of the Judiciary: Starting from the Tense Relationship Between Judicial Independence and
the State's Obligation to Financially Support the Judiciary], in Fazhi yu Xiandai
Xingzheng Faxue (M -fMi1M ) [THE RULE OF LAW AND MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE
LEGAL STUDIES] 45 (Yuanzhao Chubanshe [) I1&i [Yuanzhao Press] ed., 2004).
150 See, e.g., China's State Deficit Is Tip of Iceberg, REUTERS BREAKINGVIEWS (Mar. 3, 2010,
5:19 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/columns/zo1/o3/o3/chinas-state-budget-deficit-is-
tip-of-iceberg (discussing local government debts); Olivia Chung, China's Local Debts
Threaten Crisis, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (July 14, 2010), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
China_Business/LG14Cbo2.html.
1' See John Gapper, China's Over-Investment Is Its Achilles Heel, FIN. TIMES Bus. BLOG,
(Nov. 30, 2009, 2:38 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/businessblog/200 9 /11/chinas-over-
investment-is-its-achilles-heel.
152 Jason Sublet, China Targets Budget Deficit of 2 Percent of GDP in 2on, REUTERS (Mar.
5, 2011, 3:59 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2o11/o3/o 5/china-economy-budget-
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Although the courts occupy only a miniscule portion of the overall
budget, "' their relative political weakness nonetheless makes them
particularly vulnerable to spending cuts, especially by local governments.
Recent structural changes to judicial funding have further aggravated this
vulnerability. Starting in 2007, courts began to slash litigation fees as part of
the "justice for the people" initiative, creating a substantial gap in the judicial
budget."4 Although the central government pledged to fill it through various
special subsidies, distributed to the courts via provincial and local
governments, coordination proved complicated and costly.' 5 The judiciary lost
a considerable amount of financial independence in this process.
The push for summary procedure does, at the very least, advance the
judiciary's financial interests by saving time and resources devoted to
individual cases. Theoretically, quicker processing of cases might encourage
heavier use of courts, but the judiciary's past experience suggests otherwise:
the more frequent use of summary procedure after 2003, for example, did not
generate any significant growth in caseload. There is, therefore, much financial
upside and little downside to streamlining case procedure as much as possible.
Financial security has featured prominently in the SPC's recent policy
agenda, often in conjunction with various "judicial efficiency" measures. One
noticeable difference between the SPC's Third Five-Year Plan and its previous
two was that "strengthening the financial security of people's courts" became
an official priority: courts should collaborate with other branches of
government to normalize the approval and "regular increase" of judicial
budgets and ensure a greater measure of financial security. ,6 Shortly
afterwards, the connection between financial security and streamlining case
procedure was made in numerous statements and discussions concerning the
SPC's recent "judicial cost and efficiency" project.'57
idUSTOE 724o1ozouo 3o5 (noting that planned deficit growth .for the central
government is down to 2% of GDP, from 2.5% in 2010, and that local governments
could face greater income shortages).
'53 In 2oo6, for example, the judiciary had a budget of 2o billion yuan total. 2009 Nian
Sifa Tizhi Gaige Xin Fangan (2009 ' .1*$1- [2oo9 Agenda for Judicial
Institutional Reform], Jiaoyu Cheng (fft) [EDUC. CITY] (Mar. 16, 2009, 2:07 PM),
http://www.12edu.cn/zuowen/chfa/200 9o 3/2 5 1912.shtml. The fiscal deficit of the
central government alone was 274 billion yuan in 2oo6. Government To Cut 2007
Budget Deficit, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 5, 2007, 1:38 PM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
bizchina/2007-03/o5/content_81 9 8o4 .htm.
'5' Wang, supra note 149.
155 Id.
56 Third Five Year Plan, supra note 72, at §§ 2.22-2.24.
157 See, e.g., Jiang, supra note 105 (discussing the "economic accounting" that "judicial
efficiency" demands); Gu, supra note 105; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yingyong Yanjiusuo (
) [Institute of Applied Legal Studies of the Sup. People's
Ct.], Anli Zhidao Zhidu yu "Sifa Chengben yu Sifa Xiaolhi" Yantaohui: Huiyi Lunwen
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This project was initiated in 2008 by the Court's Institute for Applied Legal
Studies (IALS) and has yet to reach a conclusion., 8 Thus far, the IALS has
hosted three conferences, attended by a combination of SPC staff, lower court
judges, and academics in related fields. In both of the past two conferences,
SPC representatives and scholars have repeatedly highlighted the connection
between judicial efficiency and the financial health of courts, arguing that
their long-term financial security very much depends on more efficient
processing of cases.'59 This sets the tone for discussion on more specific
measures, such as the potential establishment of small-claims courts and
broader application of summary procedure.' 6° The title of the project itself, of
course, explicitly links the pursuit of "efficiency" with the cutting of "costs."
The best explanation for the SPC's recent promotion of "judicial efficiency"
and the ensuing emphasis on summary procedure is, therefore,
straightforward financial self-interest. This is, moreover, a rather strong and
forward-looking form of institutional pragmatism that does not merely react
passively to necessity, but also attempts to preempt latent problems even in
the absence of immediate need. As noted above, there is no strong argument
that Chinese courts face a scarcity of human or financial resources, nor is there
evidence that they either apply regular procedure more often than is
appropriate or that the Party leadership has applied pressure on these issues.
Instead, the SPC seems to be planning strategically for its long-term financial
security. The fact that these far-reaching policies actually do substantial
damage to both professionalism and legal populism casts doubt upon the
SPC's commitment to either ideal.
Huizong (2OLO Nian 11 Yue, Jilin Changyi) 1 . -mhlz
i , [2010 P 11 ) , * #,li a-]) [Conference on the Guiding Cases system
and "Judicial Cost and Judicial Efficiency": Conference Paper Collection (November
2010, Jilin Province, Changyi)] 2-7 (Mar. 2010) [hereinafter Changyi Conference Papers]
(on file with author); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yingyong Yanjiusuo (X)A R33Z[l1fh
*ffif) [Institute of Applied Legal Studies of the Sup. People's Ct.], Sifa Chengben yu
Sifa Xiaolui Yantaohui: Huiyi Lunwen Huizong (2009 Nian 7 Yue, Gansu Zhangye) ( Jl
-'2[sf4-Ui9: , [2009 * 7 n-, ]Kf) [Conference on
Judicial Cost and Judicial Efficiency: Conference Paper Collection (July 2009, Gansu
Province, Zhangye)] 51-57, 66-72, 98-103 (2009) [hereinafter Zhangye Conference
Papers] (on file with author).
158 Jiang, supra note 1O5; Gu, supra note 105.
19 See sources at supra note 157.
'6' Changyi Conference Papers, supra note 149, at i-ii (laying out the conference
schedule); Zhangye Conference Papers, supra note 149, at i-ii (laying out conference
schedule).
161 See supra pp. 29-31.
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B. Recent Developments in Marriage Law
The push towards greater "judicial efficiency" has influenced not only
procedural issues, but also the SPC's interpretation of substantive law. Recent
developments on this front hint at a willingness to promote simplicity and
clarity even when the broader socioeconomic costs arguably outweigh the
benefits. The best-known example-largely due to the subject's sensitivity-
has been the SPC's drafting of the Third Judicial Interpretation of the Marriage
Law, 62 which has triggered heated public discussion since a draft was released
for public comment in late 2010.
Since the ratification of China's current marriage law in 198o,63 the SPC
has issued two formal interpretations, clarifying various issues concerning
registration, divorce procedures, and marital property.' 64 As economic and
social conditions changed, however, new problems concerning extramarital
affairs, divorce, and the division of property began to emerge, intensifying the
pressure for further judicial interpretation.' 6, In response, the SPC began work
on the third interpretation in 2007 and, by 2009, had put together a
preliminary draft that was not publically released.'66 After a few delays, it
,62 Zuigao Fayuan Hunyin Fa Sifa Jieshi Zhengqiu Yijian M8 -1 Mf'ffVE
,J.) [The Supreme Court Seeks Comments on Judicial Interpretation of the Marriage
Law], Renmin Fayuan Bao (AR8150[) [PEOPLE'S CT. DAILY], Nov. 16, 2oio, at 1
[hereinafter SPC Seeks Comments on Marriage Law], available at http://www.lawtime.
cn/info/hunyin/hunyinfagui/2o11113157909.html.
'63 Hunyin Fa (M MM) [Marriage Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Sept. io, 198o, effective Jan. 1, 1981, amended Apr. 28, 2oo) [hereinafter
Marriage Law of 1981], available at http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext-form.aspx?Gid=797.
164 Guanyu Shiyong "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hunyin Fa" Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi
(Er) (A T it -l P KRM )) 1FHE N [=]) [Interpretations
Concerning Several Questions on the Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China
(Part Two)] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 26, 2003, effective Apr. 1, 2004)
SuP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAz., Jan. 1o, 2004, at 14, available at http://www.law-lib.com/
law/law-view.asp?id=81887; Guanyu Shiyong "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hunyin
Fa" Ruogan Wenti de ]ieshi (Vi) ()Z3Lfl ((ff -, Jt.l it)) - l ~~g f
[-]) [Interpretations Concerning Several Questions on the Marriage Law of the
People's Republic of China (Part One)] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 25,
2001, effective Dec. 25, 2001) SuP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ., Jan. 1, 2002, at 13, available at
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law-view.asp?id=16795.
,65 "Dangdai Zhongguo de Jiating Guannian yu Hunyin Anquan" Yantaohui (Buchong
Cailiao) (,,4-'I , [ADDITIONAL CONFERENCE
MATERIALS FOR THE SEMINAR ON THE "THE CONCEPT OF FAMILY AND THE SECURITY OF
MARRIAGE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA"] 1 (Beijing Daxue Fazhi Yanjiu Zhongxin [I- , )-
"M Zb, [Peking Univ. Research Center on the Rule of Law] et al. eds., 2010)
[hereinafter ADDITIONAL CONFERENCE MATERIALS ON FAMILY AND MARRIAGE] (on file with
author).
,66 Its contents did, however, leak out onto the internet, probably via scholars who had
access to the SPC's drafting processsee. See, e.g., Hunyin Fa Sifa Jieshi (San) (M[I
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finally released a formal draft at the 2010 meeting of the Association of
Marriage Law, seeking comments from experts in the field. 6 7 Immediately
afterwards, it made some changes and distributed the revised draft for public
comment on November 16.' 68
One of the most controversial aspects of this draft was that it placed
significant restrictions on the scope of marital property. First, courts would
consider any appreciation in value of individual property to be individual
property unless the other spouse proves that he or she contributed to the
appreciation.' 69 Even then, the language of the draft suggests that courts would
have discretion to determine whether to categorize the appreciation as marital
property. In contrast, previous judicial interpretations were silent on the issue
of passive appreciation but clearly stated that any returns from the investment
of individual property should be considered martial property.'7 ° Second, courts
would consider any real estate, given post-marriage to one spouse by his or her
parents and registered under his or her name, to be individual property.7' The
previous rule was that post-marriage gifts of real property by parents should
be considered marital property unless the parents explicitly declared
otherwise.'7' The new draft essentially established that registration under one
spouse's name would constitute an explicit declaration of intent. Third, courts
would consider any real estate purchased and registered, prior to marriage,
under the name of one spouse to be individual property, provided that he or
" [ 4-5.] 4 ~) [Third Judicial Interpretation on the Marriage Law, Draft], '
[LEGAL TIME & SPACE] (May 25, 2009, 6:04 PM), http://hi.baidu.com/falvshiwu/blog/
item/e8elcdecfecfd3 4778fo55ab.html/cmtid/6be6f5cff2e537o992457e5a.
167 Beijing Daxue Fazhi Yanjiu Zhongxin (1,) '1''I ) [Peking Univ.
Research Center on the Rule of Law], "Dangdai Zhongguo de Jiating Guannian yu
Hunyin Anquan" Yantaohui (Huiyi Zongshu) (,,Y-'q3 ,M l_ fi , ±"W i4
[ .L., ]) [Summary of the Seminar on the "The Concept of Family and the Security of
Marriage in Contemporary Chinal' 3 (2010) [hereinafter Seminar Summary on Family
and Marriage] (on file with author). This was not, of course, the first time the SPC had
sought academic commentary on this interpretation. See "Dangdai Zhongguo de Jiating
Guannian yu Hunyin Anquan" Yantaohui (Huiyi Cailiao) (jl-
- [CONFERENCE MATERIALS FOR THE SEMINAR ON THE "THE CONCEPT
OF FAMILY AND THE SECURITY OF MARRIAGE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA"] 5-1O (Beijing Daxue
Fazhi Yanjiu Zhongxin [,,, -t ,G] [Peking Univ. Research Center on the
Rule of Law] et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter CONFERENCE MATERIALS ON FAMILY AND
MARRIAGE] (on file with author).
t68 SPC Seeks Comments on Marriage Law, supra note 162
'69 Id. at § 6.
170 Interpretations Concerning Several Questions on the Marriage Law of the People's
Republic of China (Part Two), supra note 164, at § I.1.
1' SPC Seeks Comments on Marriage Law, supra note 162, at § 8.
172 Marriage Law ofi 9 8, supra note 163, at §§ 17.4, 18.3.
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she also paid the down payment.' If the other spouse contributed to
mortgage payments after marriage, he or she may recover those payments,
including any appreciation in value, but would still have no title in the
property.' 74 The new interpretations would apply to any divorce proceeding,
regardless of the time of marriage.' 75
These measures drew fierce criticism upon their public release. A number
of intellectuals that self-identified as "culturally conservative" lashed out at
what they considered an attack on the institution of marriage. They argued
that modern Chinese marriages relied heavily on marital property as a
"binding force" within the family and that by limiting the scope of martial
property, the SPC was weakening the durability of marriage. 6 First, dividing
marital property is inherently complex and difficult, whereas designating
items as individual property significantly simplifies the process of divorce."
Especially in the case of real estate, dividing jointly owned property is far more
complicated than simply ensuring that each side receives half the total value.
There are also numerous non-financial concerns to consider, such as living
habits, psychological comfort levels, and so on.'T8 By designating more real
estate as individual, instead of marital, property, the SPC's draft interpretation
would substantially lower' the "transaction costs" of divorce for many
households. Second, by labeling more types of property as "individual," the
draft interpretation encourages spouses to think of themselves as
"individuals," rather than as "part of a family."'79 Complaints against the
"cultural invasion" of "Western individualism" often accompany such
arguments.'"
Dislike of the draft is not limited to "cultural conservatives." Some
marriage law experts have also raised concerns on whether the new rules on
individual property appreciation are consistent with "the general principles of
Chinese marriage law," which supposedly assume that all property is marital
property unless clearly stated otherwise.'8 ' Others have questioned whether
the rules are equitable to women. They argue that it is customary in China for
173 SPC Seeks Comments on Marriage Law, supra note 162, at § ii.
174 Id.
175 Id. at § 21.
176 Seminar Summary on Family and Marriage, supra note 167, at 4-6, 8-9, 11-14
(condemning the draft interpretation for weakening the institution of marriage by
limiting the scope of marital property).
,7 Id. at 3-4, 1o (discussing the economic and social complexity of marital property).
178 Id.
'79 Id. at 4-6 (discussing the interpretation's "assault on marriage").
,so Id. at 11-14 (discussing the "Western" approach to marriage that dominates modern
Chinese legal doctrine).
ADDITIONAL CONFERENCE MATERIALS ON FAMILY AND MARRIAGE, supra note 165, at 1-2.
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the groom or his family to purchase the newly-weds' first residence, while the
bride's family provides furnishings and daily appliances of roughly equal
value.ls The underlying social presumption is that the spouses would share
ownership of all items, and the new draft interpretation contradicts this by
categorizing the residence as the groom's individual property.' s While real
estate generally appreciates in value with the passage of time, furnishings and
appliances depreciate.' 84 Thus, unless the real estate was registered under the
bride's name or under joint ownership, the groom would enjoy a substantial
economic advantage even when the initial monetary investment was largely
equal for both spouses. And even if the new rules encourage newlyweds to
take greater precautions when registering real estate, this does not justify
applying them to marriages that predate their issuance, which the draft clearly
intends to do.
This feeds into broader concerns over whether the draft interpretations
exclude from "marital property" important items that are customarily
understood to jointly owned, or at least complicated enough to warrant
determination on a case-by-case basis. Considerable social ambiguity also
surrounds, for example, post-marriage property conveyances by parents, who
can be frustratingly vague in their intentions. Given these uncertainties, the
SPC should, perhaps, be more cautious about artificially imposing uniform
norms over socially complex issues. s5
On one hand, these criticisms may exaggerate the actual socioeconomic
effect of the draft interpretation: even if formally issued, the rules would only
apply where the parties were unable reach a property division agreement
among themselves. 86 More importantly, whether legal norms actually wield
significant influence over social marriage practices is highly questionable,
given the myriad of marriage customs that saturate local Chinese society. On
the other hand, the criticisms do draw attention to the socioeconomic
complexity of, Chinese marriage practices and to the wide variety of
unintended consequences that the draft interpretations may eventually have.
,82 Id.; Yu Huaiqing (fI'V1), Quanguo Fulian Zhaokai "Hunyin Fa Jieshi (San)
Zhengqiu Yijian Gao" Zhuanjia Yantaohui .
4) [The National Women's Association Hosts an Expert Panel on the Public
Comment Draft of the Third Interpretation of the Marriage Law], Renmin Wang (A KFlA)
[PEOPLE'S NET] (Dec. 13, 2010, 4:27 PM), http://acwf.people.com.cn/GB/i34695o8.html.
8I ADDITIONAL CONFERENCE MATERIALS ON FAMILY AND MARRIAGE, supra note 165, at 1-2;
Yu, supra note 182.
184 ADDITIONAL CONFERENCE MATERIALS ON FAMILY AND MARRIAGE, supra note 165, at 1.
85 Seminar Summary on Family and Marriage, supra note 167, at 3-4, 10.
16 Hunyin Fa (M'W ) [Marriage Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Apr. 28, 2oo, effective Apr. 28, 2001) § 39, 2001 STANDING COMM. NAT'L
PEOPLE'S CONG. 330, available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2oo2/slc/slc.asp?
db=chl&gid=35339 (revising the original 1981 law).
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The point here is not to evaluate any specific consequence, but to highlight
the tremendous practical uncertainties that surround the draft interpretations.
The question, then, is why the SPC decided to establish uniform rules for
social practices of such complexity. The SPC has issued only a vague statement
that the draft interpretation was designed to "protect the stability of marriage,
protect each individual's rights and freedoms, balance the interests of all
family members, and balance the relationship between family and society."'8
Court officials were, however, more candid during several counseling sessions
they requested from a group of marriage law experts: scholars returning from
these sessions report that the officials were concerned, above all else, with
simplifying and clarifying property division rules so that, should negotiation
fail, the judge could issue a decision more swiftly and with less ambiguity.' s In
other words, they wanted to make the judiciary's job easier.
This explanation seems quite plausible. As noted above, by significantly
compressing the scope of marital property, particularly real property, the draft
interpretations eliminate the considerable complexity and uncertainty that
marital property brings to the divorce process.' 89 And apart from the
convenience it brings to judges, the merits of eliminating this ambiguity are
unclear. The criticisms discussed above call into question whether the new
rules indeed "protect the stability of marriage" or are equitable to all family
members. Several scholars who have been i nvolved in the drafting process
since at least 2009 have repeatedly voiced such concerns to the SPC,' 90 but
with no apparent effect.'9' This attracted further complaints that the SPC was
overlooking broader socioeconomic consequences and express public
87 ADDITIONAL CONFERENCE MATERIALS ON FAMILY AND MARRIAGE, supra note 165, at 7
(reprinting statements at the Annual Meeting of the Marriage Law Association by Du
Wanting, head of the First Civil Division, Supreme People's Court of China).
M Seminar Summary on Family and Marriage, supra note 166, at 3 (statement of Ma
Yinan).
89 See discussion surrounding supra notes 176, 177.
'90 CONFERENCE MATERIALS ON FAMILY AND MARRIAGE, supra note 167, at 5-1o (reporting
expert commentary on an earlier draft).
9! The designation of pre-marriage real estate purchases registered under one spouse's
name as personal property, arguably the most controversial item in the draft
interpretation, Seminar Summary on Family and Marriage, supra note 166, at 4 (noting
that this item "attracted the most controversy"), existed at least as early as the 2009
leaked draft. See Third Judicial Interpretation on the Marriage Law, Draft, supra note 166,
at § 13. A later draft, issued to experts in early 2oO, kept this item and added the rule
on gifts by parents. CONFERENCE MATERIALS ON FAMILY AND MARRIAGE, supra note 167, at
8, 9. Considering that the draft issued for public comment in November kept both
these items while adding the rule on appreciation in value, it seems fair to say that the
SPC's stance on compressing marital property has actually strengthened over time,
despite the controversy it has been attracting.
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disapproval in its single-minded pursuit of normative simplicity and judicial
efficiency.' 92
There is, therefore, considerable reason to believe that the SPC's primary
objective in pushing forth the new marriage law interpretations was the
pursuit of doctrinal simplicity and judicial efficiency. It is unclear whether
financial concerns were behind these objectives, although the draft
interpretation certainly would speed up a significant number of divorce
proceedings. More importantly, providing judges with a set of clear guidelines
that limit the scope of marital property allows them to avoid entanglement
with any number of practical complications commonly associated with the
economic separation of a household. The ability to distance itself from socially
complicated and emotionally charged disputes is probably just as valuable to
the judiciary as the conservation of financial and human resources.' 93
The solicitation of public comments for the draft interpretation suggests the
influence of populist concerns, but populism explains only the solicitation of
comments and not the substantive content of the proposed draft. In fact, one
could argue that the solicitation of comments was pragmatically designed to
absorb public criticism and controversy before the interpretation's final
publication.'94 While few would deny that recent SPC activity has displayed
significant shades of populism, it seems questionable whether populist
concerns actually influenced the Court's drafting of substantive legal rules. In
this particular example, there is no logical connection between populism-or,
for that matter, legal professionalism-and the doctrinal scope of marital
192 Seminar Summary on Family and Marriage, supra note 167, at 2-4 (discussing
scholarly responses to earlier drafts).
193 This particular draft has been no slacker in this department, as the above discussion
makes clear.
194 While this is largely speculation, there are examples from the Chinese government's
past use of public comment mechanisms in which controversy after the issuance of a
draft seemed to exhaust public attention enough that the finalized documents, which
kept nearly all the controversial items, did not attracted nearly as much attention. The
most famous example is probably the controversy surrounding the WRM [Property
Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007)
2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. 291, available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/
2007-03/19/content-554452.htm. See Yu Zeyuan (-f - ), Qibai Duo Ming Ren
Shangshu Hu Jintao, Zhi Moquan Fa Reng Weixian Ying Jiuzheng (-Liff J - A._- iS]
M. - [Over 700 People Petition Hu Jintao, Arguing that the
Property Law Remains Unconstitutional and Needs to Be Revised], Lianhe Zaobao (IK .
-Y- J ) [LIANHE MORNING POST], Dec. 14, 2006, at 18, available at http://www.
wyzxsx.com/Article/Class2l/2oo612/12854.html. No comparable public outcry
accompanied the issuance of the finalized legislation in 2007, even though it retained
the same acknowledgment and protection of private property that critics had argued
was unconstitutional.
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property.' 95 Here again, institutional self-interest seems to be the strongest
motivation.
C. "Guiding Cases"
Although the Party leadership has seemingly strengthened its control over
the judiciary in recent years, the SPC has by no means abandoned its pursuit
of greater institutional authority. Quite the opposite, the recent establishment
of the "guiding cases" system, which gives "guiding cases" approved by the
Court stare decisis-like status, theoretically boosts its powers of judicial
interpretation to unprecedented heights., 6 Compared to the developments
discussed in the previous two sections, the issuance of "guiding cases" has a
weaker connection with issues of substantive or procedural justice, but has far
greater impact on the SPC's judicial authority. Correspondingly, it also throws
its institutional ambitions into much sharper relief.
The establishment of the "guiding cases" system was, by Chinese legal
standards, a very drawn-out affair. As early as 1985, the SPC had begun to
identify "standard cases" (AIJA ) (dianxing anli) via its official bulletin,
although the binding force of these cases was unclear and, moreover, they
almost never touched upon ambiguities or gaps in judicial doctrine.'97 Instead,
the Court used them primarily as an advocacy tool for the correct application
of well-established 'doctrine.'8 Not until the publication of its Second Five-
Year Plan in 2005 did the creation of a "guiding cases" system become a formal
policy objective.' 99 Under this system, the SPC would select and publish
"guiding cases" from lower court decisions, which would be explicitly binding
195 Scholars have argued that public opinion is quite against the compression of marital
property, at least through these specific measures. Seminar Summary on Family and
Marriage, supra note 167, at 3. A populist legal philosophy would therefore at least urge
caution, whereas the SPC's desire to limit marital property has apparently strengthened
throughout the drafting process. See supra note 191. On the other hand, legal
professionalism, as defined in supra notes 36 and 37, simply demands that judges
enforce legal rules objectively, without expressly commenting on the substance of those
rules.
196 Guanyu Anli Zhidao Gongzuo de Guiding ( fWT] _l1) [Regulations
on Guiding Cases] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Nov. 26, 2OO, effective Nov.
26, 2010) (Chinalawinfo), available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.
asp?db=chl&gid=14 387o.
197 Li Shichun (4ftf), Anli Zhidao Zhidu de Ling Yi Tiao Silu-Sifa Neng Dong Zhuyi
zai Zhongguo de Youxian Shiyong (00 Jl]N4 M N- ,TVA--'UML-13Er-tl
If PR 3t f_ .) [An Alternative Path for the Guiding Cases System-The Limited
Applicability ofludicial Activism to China], Faxue (8!i-) [LEGAL STUDY], no.6, 2009, at 59,
61-62, available at http://wenku.baidu.com/view/5oed92c 5 aaoob5 2acfc7 ca2l.html.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 62.
Columbia Journal ofAsian Law, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2012)
over similar cases."' From its earliest conception, the system was designed as
a judicial interpretation mechanism, through which the Court could flexibly
react to ambiguities and gaps in doctrine. As the Second Five-Year Plan rather
ambitiously stated, the system would allow the Court to "enrich and develop
jurisprudence."' '°
After some preliminary experimentation in local courts, the Court
adjusted the posting of "standard cases" on its bulletin to incorporate cases
that expanded, rather than simply reiterated, judicial doctrine.0 2 The slow
pace of bulletin posting and uncertainties concerning the cases' binding force,
however, prevented these adjustments from making any significant doctrinal
mark. 0 3 By 2009, the Court had made little apparent progress in creating a
workable "guiding cases" system.20 4 The Third Five-Year Plan made no
mention of the system, fueling academic speculation that the project had been
put on hiatus. 5
The project had, in fact, drawn much criticism during its four-year test
run. In particular, critics worried about the project's constitutional validity.
They argued that such a sweeping enhancement of the SPC's institutional
competence required formal legislation by the National People's Congress. 6
And more provocatively, they contended that the system would give rise to a
fresh wave of "dangerous" judicial activism: the issuance of "guiding cases"
could make changes to judicial doctrine so swiftly and subtly that other party
or government organs could not monitor them. 7 When the system failed to
materialize by 2009, these critics wondered, with a hint of satisfaction,
whether such concerns of institutional balance had led Party leaders to
suspend the project208
200 id.
201 Second Five-Year Plan, supra note 8o, at § 13.
.0. Li, supra note 197, at 62-63. On the role of local courts, see id. at 66-67.
203 Id. at 63. See also, Li Shichun (4±4), Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Zhongguo Faxue (4P
M,&*) [China Legal Science], Zhongguo Anli Zhidao Zhidu de Kunju yu Chulu (fPi M
ffin.[-IjJIM) [The Current Difficulties and Potential Solutions for
China's Guiding Cases System], Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Minshang Fa Qianyan Luntan
Yanjiang (-t) [Speech at the Forum on the Frontiers of
Civil and Commercial Law at Renmin University of China] (Mar. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=44157 (discussing in greater detail
the limited success of the SPC's experimentation with guiding cases).
204 Li, supra note 197, at 63.
205 Id. at 6o.
206 Id. at 71.
207 Id. at 72-73.
2o8 Id. at 6o.
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Thus, it came as a surprise to many when Zhou Yongkang, the Politburo
Standing Committee member in charge of the law enforcement apparatus,
gave the project a public statement of approval in late 2009, breathing fresh
life into what had seemed to be a dead initiative.0 9 Zhou's support did come
with a catch: all three branches of the law enforcement apparatus-the
judiciary, the procuratorate, and the public security bureaus-would establish
a "guiding cases" system, perhaps to maintain the balance of power between
them.2 "° Having secured the Party's blessing, the SPC swiftly moved to
formalize the system. On November 26, 2010, it issued the "Regulations
Concerning the Use of Guiding Cases," more than five years since its initial
conception. "'
A "guiding case" can, at least in theory, come from any level of the
judiciary. While only the adjudication committee of the SPC may formally
approve "guiding cases," any lower court may recommend a case within its
jurisdiction to its appellate court, until the case reaches the SPC.212 Moreover,
any adjudicatory arm of the SPC may recommend cases, with no jurisdictional
limitations.2 3 Perhaps as a nod to populism, the Regulations also grant any
"person interested in the work of the judiciary" the right to recommend a case,
but only to the court that decided it.
2t 4
To process the anticipated flow of case recommendations, the SPC also
established a special "guiding cases office" to select and research cases for final
209 Sun Chunyu & Zhang Cuisong (4/'N & O ), Tuixing Anli Zhidao Zhidu de
Biyaoxing yu Kexingxing (t-iy:'J~t-$iJ ' 1,i-:Tifi) [The Necessity and
Plausibility of Establishing a Guiding Cases System], Jiancha Ribao ( -& H ) [PROC.
DAILY], Dec. 24, 2oo, at 3, available at http://theory.people.com.cn/GB13576232.html
(noting that Zhou's speech brought the guiding cases system to the procuratorate's
attention).
210 Id. (noting that Zhou's speech signaled the end of the SPC's "exclusive claim" to
experimenting with guiding cases); Guanyu Anli Zhidao Gongzuo de Guiding ( TZ
J 'V [ -JR5) [Regulations on Guiding Cases] (promulgated by the Sup. People's
Proc., July 30, 2010, effective July 30, 2010) (Chinalawinfo), available at http://vip.
chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=143872. The Public Security
Bureau has been more low-key, but, as of early 2on, has nonetheless established a
comparable apparatus. Jiang Anjie (3( ), "Liang Gao" Yanjiushi Zhuren Xiangtan
"Zhongguo Tese Anli Zhidao Zhidu" de Goujian ("."X -1I.IW "@ EP Mi _ l
If'J&"M fM) [The Research Division Chief of the "Two Supremes" Discusses the
Construction of a "Guiding Cases System with Chinese Characteristics], Fazhi Wang (8
f$J I) [LEGAL DAILY] (Jan. 5, 2011, 9:52 AM), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zfb/content/
2011-01/05/content_2427 555 .htm (interview with Hu Yunteng, Chief of the SPC's
Research Office).
2 Regulations on Guiding Cases, supra note 196.
2 2 id. at § 4.
213 Id.
214 Id. at § 5.
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approval by the adjudication committee."' The Regulations are unclear on
whether the office may directly select a case without any external
recommendation, and their wording suggests that its predominant task will
simply be the processing of recommendations. 6 Approved "guiding cases" will
be published via the SPC's website, its official bulletin, or the People's Court
Daily, although the guiding cases office will gather and publish them in
annotated volumes from time to time."' Finally, the SPC may choose to give
formal "guiding case" status to any "standard case" it has previously published,
without going through the recommendation procedure. 
8
A "guiding case" must be one that "has attracted broad public attention,"
relies upon "legal principles that are not defined in detail," is "representative"
of similar cases, touches upon "difficult, complicated or unprecedented legal
issues," and "can serve as a guide for other cases."" 9 These criteria make it
manifestly clear that the SPC sees the "guiding cases" system as an expansion
of its judicial interpretation authority. All "guiding cases" are, of course,
binding over lower court decisions until the approval of a new "guiding"
paradigm."'
Despite the many similarities between a "guiding case" and a legal
precedent in common law jurisdictions, the SPC and scholars closely
associated with it have repeatedly emphasized that the two are "completely
different": common law judges supposedly "make law," whereas "guiding
cases" are simply interpretations and applications of preexisting law.2
Whether this is a reasonable assessment would be a different paper altogether.
The point here is that the SPC's lengthy pursuit of the "guiding cases" system
reflects a deep-seated desire to strengthen its institutional competence, rather
than ideological commitment to either populism or professionalism. SPC
leadership has actually taken great care to portray the issuance of "guiding
"I Id. at § 3.
216 Id.
217 Id. at § 6.
2,8 Id. at § 9.
219 Id. at § 2.
220 Id. at § 7; Anjie (jh), Hu Yunteng Jiedu Guanyu Anli Zhidao Zhidu de Guiding (M
i j-lJ t) [Hu Yunteng Explains the Regulations on Guiding
Cases], Dongfang Fa Yan (*)'ill) [E. LEGAL PERSP.] (Jan. 11, 2011, 7:49 PM),
http://www.dffy.com/fazhixinwen/lifa/2o1101/2011O111195o43.htm (clarifying that "1)_
MR" [yingdang canzhao] means "must apply"). Hu Yunteng is the current chief of the
SPC's Research Office.
22 See, e.g., Zhang Zhiming (K ), Dui Zhongguo Jianli Anli Zhidao Zhidu de Jiben
Renshi (]4 ' ~ - Wi] 4h lJi : k .. ) [Basic Understandings on China's
Establishment of the Guiding Cases System], Fazhi Wang (MMM) [LEGAL DAILY] (Jan. 30,
2011, 4:33 PM), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zbzk/content/zo1-ol/3O/content-
246 3 586.htm?node=25496.
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cases" as consistent with both ideals: the chief of the SPC Research Office,
which drafted the Regulations, has recently stated that a guiding case must
"receive the approval of the people," but also "promote the rule of law. '222 This
seems to echo Zhou Yongkang's 2009 statement that "guiding cases" should
address areas of law where "the enforcement of law is inconsistent, and where
the public has expressed strong opinions."22 ' As with the developments
discussed in Part I, these statements reflect the ideological ambiguity of a legal
system caught between two frequently contradictory models of legal reform.
Still, the SPC has persisted with its pursuit of the authority to issue "guiding
cases" in spite of ideological shifts or leadership changes, suggesting that
something more deeply rooted in the SPC's institutional mentality is at work
here.
Regardless of which ideological direction the SPC rhetorically takes, it
maintains a fundamental and highly pragmatic interest in enhancing its own
judicial interpretation powers. The establishment of the "guiding cases" system
provides the SPC with an interpretative mechanism that operates with far
greater flexibility and efficiency, but draws less public attention than formal
interpretations or opinions. The system also strengthens the SPC's control
over lower courts, binding the judiciary into a tighter institutional unit.
Indeed, the Second Five-Year Plan explicitly states that a primary objective of
the "guiding cases" system would be to "guide the adjudicatory activities of
lower courts."2" Legal reform ideologies and chief justices may come and go,
but the pragmatism that leads the SPC to protect its core interests amid
political volatility is probably always there.
One could even argue that the new SPC leadership has displayed a
particularly sharp sense of political tact by negotiating the final arrangement
to extend "guiding cases" to the procuratorate and the public security bureaus.
We may never know the precise reason Zhou and other Party Leaders decided
to establish the system in all three branches of the law enforcement apparatus,
but that the SPC's long-stalled initiative only managed to win their approval in
this particular form suggests that they might have felt uncomfortable allowing
the SPC to proceed unilaterally. The final arrangement shows, therefore, some
signs of a negotiated compromise, where the SPC agreed to, or perhaps even
proposed, to share the expansion in institutional competence with other law
enforcement branches in exchange for broader political support.
III. REINTERPRETING THE SPC'S IDEOLOGICAL AFFILIATIONS
I have argued, therefore, that the SPC's recent activities contain a strong
dose of institutional pragmatism that often operates independently of, or even
222 An, supra note 220.
223 Sun & Zhang, supra note 209.
224 Second Five-Year Plan, supra note 8o, at § 13.
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contrary to, its rhetorical embrace of legal populism or professionalism.
Taking this one step further, this Part suggests that the Court's recent stances
towards populism and professionalism themselves derive as much from
pragmatic maneuvering as they do from genuine ideological commitment: it is
very much in the SPC's current self-interest to strengthen its political and
popular legitimacy by advocating populism while continuing to enhance its
institutional status and competence through the long-term pursuit of legal
professionalism and judicial independence. Several components of its
"populist" agenda, particularly its zealous promotion of mediation, actually
smack more of pragmatic self-interest than genuine ideological commitment.
The "tension between trends toward professionalism and populism""' that
scholars have observed may thus reflect more the juggling of short-term versus
long-term interests than real philosophical tension.
The SPC's promotion of legal populism can be viewed as the judiciary's
response to a broader "ruling for the people" (VLiYsijK) (zhizheng weimin)
initiative that has permeated the Party-state since 2002226 Perhaps wary of
rising levels of social unrest and sensing a greater need to enhance its public
legitimacy, the state has taken great pains in recent years to present itself as
responsive to the needs and opinions of the public. This trend covers broad
swathes of state activity, from seeking public comment on draft legislation and
regulations to systematically soliciting feedback on government activity. 7
25 Liebman, supra note 2, at 1, 7.
226 "Ruling for the people" was made a central Party slogan during the CCP's Sixteenth
National Congress in 2002. See Zhang Shiyi (M±3L), Guanyu Li Dang Wei Gong,
Zhizheng Weimin de Wen Da (J-T- , #A)jKMlfn ) [Q&A on "Establishing
the Party for Public Justice, and Ruling for the People'], Renmin Ribao (kR HJR)
[PEOPLE's DAILY], Aug. 21, 2003, at 9, available at http://www.people.com.cn/
GB/news/2o28 317.html; Yao Meiping (tiUof), "Jiedu" Zhizheng Weimin (gi "4i/3
K") [Interpreting "Ruling for the People], Renmin Ribao (A R H T) [PEOPLE'S DAILY],
Feb. 1o, 2003, at 5, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/26/2oo3o21o/
920 349.html. It remains a central slogan today. See Xu Tianliang (&,X, ), Zhuoli
Jiaqiang Yi Ren Wei Ben, Zhizheng Weimin Jiaoyu-Xuexi Guanche Hu Jintao Tongzhi
zai Shiqi Jie Zhongyang Jiwei Liu Ci Quanhui shang de Zhongyao Jianghua (a)j:JMI1
[Vigorously Strengthen Education on "Put the People First, and Rule for the People"-
Studying and Implementing HuJintao's Important Speech at the Sixth Central Meeting of
the Seventeenth Central Disciplinary Committee], Renmin Ribao (A.R_ ELS) [PEOPLE'S
DAILY], Mar. 2, 2011, at 4, available at http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/14o35892
.html.
227 See Jamie P. Horsley, Public Participation in the People's Republic: Developing a
More Participatory Governance Model in China (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/ntellectual-Life/CL-PP-PP-in
thePRCFINAL916o9.pdf; Wang Xixin, The Public, Expert and Government in the
Public Decision-making Process: A Case Study of China's Price-Setting Hearing System
and Its Practice, PEKING UNIV. J. LEGAL STUD., no. 1, 2oo8, at 71; Jamie P. Horsley, Public
Participation and the Democratization of Chinese Governance, in POLITICAL CIVILIZATION
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Party leaders in charge of the law enforcement system have likewise called for
the judiciary to increase its responsiveness to the "people's needs." 2sThe
SPC's "populist turn" is, therefore, its way of participating in this general policy
trend.
The actual policy measures that the SPC has taken under the veil of
populism respond very much to the specific challenges it faces. For several
years, one of the SPC leadership's main policy objectives has been the
reduction of "litigation-related petitions" received from the "letters and visits"
system ( 6f9i{hi) (shesu xinfang).2 9 These involve dissatisfied litigants filing
a complaint with either a higher court or some other government organ,
usually to appeal an unfavorable decision. The petitioning system is not part of
the formal adjudication process, has few procedural obligations to the
petitioner, and operates more or less as a black box that very rarely provides
the petitioner with real assistance. 30 Its informal nature does, however, make
it a relatively low-cost way for unhappy litigants to voice their grievances. The
SPC has, therefore, often measured public dissatisfaction towards the judiciary
by the volume of litigation-related petitions, even as it portrays the petitioning
AND MODERNIZATION: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF CHINA'S REFORM 207 (Yang Zhong &
Shipin Hua eds., 2006).
228 Zhou Yongkang (Jfl71t), Jianding Bu Yi Zuo Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Shiye de
Jianshezhe he Hanweizhe ( lA Q ]-±$i -lI 2llh )
[Resolutely Be the Constructors and Protectors of Socialist Enterprise with Chinese
Characteristics], *A- [QIu SHI], no. 15, 2oo8, at 3, available at http://news.xinhuanet
.com/legal/2oo8-o8/ol/content_8888 433.htm.
229 For earlier references, see, e.g., Xiao Yang (P 4i), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo
Baogao (2005) ( [2005]) [Supreme People's Court Work Report
(2005)], STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ., Apr. io, 2005, at 236 (delivered at
the 3 d plenary session of the ioth National People's Congress on March 9, 20o5),
available at http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/gzbg/20100 3 /t2oloo 3102612.htm
(discussing how to "reduce litigation related xinfang from the roots"); Xiao Yang (M T),
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao (2004) (M ' [A K T [20041)
[Supreme People's Court Work Report (2004)], STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG.
GAZ., Mar. 31, 2004, at 200 (delivered at the 2d plenary session of the ioth National
People's Congress on March 11, 2004), available at http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/
gzbg/2oo3/t20oo31o_2628.htm. The SPC has recently ratcheted up its efforts to
reduce petitions.-Chen Fei & Yang Weihan (l & fiV..), Zuigao Fayuan Wu Xiang
Jucuo Yufang he Jianshao Shesu Xinfang (, J [The
Supreme Court Issues Five Measures to Preempt and Reduce Litigation Related Xinfang],
Xinhua Wang (,M* ) [XINHUA NET] (Feb. 8, 2o11, 8:39 AM), http://news.xinhuanet
.com/legal/2o11-o2/o8/c_13722152.htm.
230 See Zhang Taisu, Why the Chinese Public Prefer Administrative Petitioning over
Litigation, SOC. STUD., no. 3, 2oo9, at 139; cf. Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to
Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1o3, 176-77 (2oo6) (arguing that
xinfang is, in fact, an effective system).
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system as a necessary means of accessing public opinion.3 Petitions are, of
course, also irritating to courts because they often draw unwanted public
attention and consume large amounts of time and energy. All things
considered, the SPC has a very strong incentive to prevent litigation-related
petitions to the extent possible and has clearly expressed the desire to do so,
particularly recently. 3
Since around 20o8, the SPC has advocated mediation not only as a move
towards legal populism, but also as an effective way to reduce litigation-related
petitions. 33 The Party leadership gave this its public blessing in August
2009, 234 setting off a fresh wave of rigorous SPC advocacy.23 5 The basic
23, See Zhengque Duidai Shesu Xinfang Wenti (.Ef -, fA ) [Correctly
Treating the Problem of Litigation Related Xinfang], Zuogao Renmin Fayuan Wangzhan
a AM A R [RIi [Sup. PEOPLE'S CT.] (an. 29, 2oo, 6:24 PM), http://www.court.gov.cn
/spyw/laxf/201001/tzolool29_81o.htm.
232 Chen& Yang, supra note 229.
133 Recent speeches by the SPC leadership suggest that it had internally encouraged the
use of mediation to lower xinfang rates since 2o08. See Qiu Lihua & Yang Weihan ( 3
1-P & AMR), Minshi Anjian Shesu Xinfang Lii, Qiangzhi Zhixing Lii "Liang Xiajiang"
(K , - -f-, J, " [The Xinfang Rate and Coercive
Enforcement Rate of Civil Cases Both Decline], Xinhua Wang (,frIl) [XINHUA NET]
(June 24, 2011, 12:o1 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2oii-o6/24/C_21577223.htm
(reporting speech of Xi Xiaoming, SPC Vice President). Wang's first work report in early
2009, for example, discussed litigation-related xinfang, the "Ma Xiwu method," and
mediation in immediate sequence, and made clear that the three were closely
interconnected. Wang, SPC Work Report 2009, supra note 69. This partially explains
why local courts have repeatedly made the similar statements since 2oo8. See, e.g.,
Liang Zhibin (;), Shifayuan Yunyong Langfang Jingyan Jiejue Shesu Xinfang
Anjian Zuotanhui (Zhailu) (rMR'L,--) i [ ]
[Panel on How the Municipal Court Uses the Langfang Experience to Handle Litigation-
Related Xinfang (Excerpts)], Langfang Fayuan Wang (JtitM1) [LANGFANG CT. NET]
(Sept. 5, 2008, 10:59 AM), http://lfzy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=i8i&apage=l;
Xie Kang & Liu Xing (iW, & A'J-), Jiangnan Qu Fayuan Goujian Shesu Xinfang Yufang
Jizhi (MT M x M R - W fA i&-i JT * & $J ) [iangnan District Court Establishes
Mechanisms to Preempt Litigation-Related Xinfang], Fazhi Kuaibao (M t ka)
[BREAKING LEGAL NEWS], Mar. 13, 2o08, available at http://www.pagx.cn/htmi/2oo8/3-
13/2oo803131042o6888.html.
234 Liu Juntao (ACTMT), Zhongyang Zhengfawei jiu Jiaqiang he Gaijin Shefa Shesu
Xinfang Gongzuo Yijian Da Jizhe Wen (
ji 1L-2.- (6) [The Central Committee on Political and Judicial Affairs Responds to
Reporters' Questions on Its Opinions on Strengthening and Reforming the Processing of
Litigation-Related Xinfang], Renmin Wang (,klR ) [PEOPLE'S NET] (Aug. 18, 2009, 5:19
PM), http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/9884o84.html. This would hardly be the
'first time that the Party leadership approved reform measures first proposed within the
judiciary. The negotiations over guiding cases discussed at supra pp. 42-44 are another
prominent example.
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rationale seems to be that mediated results are less likely to provoke petitions
because they require the consent of both sides.236 Whether this is true in
practice is unclear: the percentage of cases mediated, as discussed above, has
leapt to over 6o% after 2006,237 but the volume of litigation-related petitions
still increased in most years, with the exception of a sharp drop in 2006-2007
and a more moderate one in 2010.38 Nonetheless, the SPC continues to
consider mediation an effective countermeasure against popular complaints.
The SPC's recent establishment of a national performance evaluation
system adds a fresh layer of institutional pressure to mediate. Although local
courts have experimented with such measures since at least 2003, this would
be the first time that that the SPC has formally sanctioned them-in the past,
the SPC had largely cautioned against abuse of performance indicators.239 As
with the application of summary procedure, the indicator system sees a higher
rate of mediation as an unqualified positive that directly reflects the quality of
a judge's work. 240
The inconsistencies discussed above between the use' of target
performance levels and both legal professionalism and populism also apply to
the use of mediation statistics.' By giving judges a strong personal interest to
apply mediation as often as possible, the evaluation system not only runs a
large risk of obstructing the accurate determination of facts and application of
law, but also substantially increases the likelihood that judges will force
procedural choices on litigants. Thus the SPC's promotion of mediation,
235 Most recently, see Wujian (A), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan jiu Shesu Xinfang Gongzuo
Xiafa Xilie Wenjian ( [The Supreme Court
Issues a Series of Documents on Addressing Litigation-Related Xinfang], Renmin Fayuan
Bao (AK. PM) [PEOPLE'S CT. DAILY], May 16, 2Ol, at i, available at http://rmfyb.
chinacourt.org/paper/html/2o1-o 5 /i6/content_27 313 .htm.
236 Id.; Chen Fei (j0), Wang Shengjun: Zhuzhong Yunyong Tiaojie Shouduan Jiejue
Susong Nan, Zhixing Nan Wenti (TPA&U: ilisJlMA-T W , 4tfARM)
[Wang Shengjun: Emphasize the Use of Mediation to Resolve Litigation and Enforcement
Difficulties], Xinhua Wang (,M * R ) [XINHUA NET] (July 28, 2009, 9:43 PM),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-07/28/content-n 788 4o 7.htm. See also Minzner,
supra note 4, at 42-43 (critically assessing such claims).
237 See supra note 73.
3 For the decreases in 2006 and 2010, see Xiao, SPC Work Report 2007, supra note 117;
and Wang, SPC Work Report 2011, supra note 73. See Zhang, supra note 230, at 147 for
pre-2oo5 trends, and Liu Hualei (R'J ,"), Shefa Shesu Xinfang Wenti Yanjiu (6,rHrT
M}iih-(n1) R ) [Research on Law-Related or Litigation-Related Xinfang], Jishu yu
Shichang (4A * -i ) [TECH. & MARKET], no. 12, Dec. 2009 at 26, available at
http://www.lawpass.cn/sifa/1o49.html, for 2007-2009 trends.
239 See discussion supra notes 127-128.
240 See discussion supra notes 121-126.
4' See discussion supra pp. 31-32.
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arguably the poster-child of Chinese judicial populism, ironically contains
institutional mechanisms that violate populist ideals. This calls into question,
once again, the depth and "purity" of the SPC's commitment to legal populism.
But these mechanisms do fit into a pragmatic reading of SPC intent. As
noted above, the SPC seems to believe that, because mediated results
represent mutual compromises between the litigants, they can create
significant psychological and social pressure on them to abide by it or, at least,
refrain from bring related disputes to government authorities, thereby
lowering the likelihood of a litigation-related petition.'
Some scholars would argue this is only part of the cost-benefit calculation:
the potential increase in coerced mediation might trigger significant public
dissatisfaction over the long run. 43 Still, so far there is no indication that the
SPC shares these concerns. Moreover, even coerced mediation can
theoretically preempt litigation-related petitions. To litigants, it may seem
harder to argue that "the judge forced me into this compromise" than to argue
that an adjudicated decision was wrong, especially if the presiding judge had
some sense of tact. The greater perceived difficulty of proving their case might
deter these unsatisfied litigants against further petitioning. An overemphasis
on mediation could, therefore, lead to lower petitioning rates even without
any corresponding increase in overall public satisfaction.
Whether this kind of deterrence tactic benefits the Party-state as a whole
is unclear. It is worth noting that the Party leadership's 2009 approval was
devoid of technical details and therefore has not officially approved the use of
target performance levels to semi-coercively boost mediation.2" Unexpressed
discontent may well be more dangerous to its sociopolitical footing than
expressed discontent.245 The SPC leadership, on the other hand, would reap
considerable benefits from a short-term drop in litigation-related petitions,
which strengthens its political reputation and standing., 6 This suggests that
the SPC's sanctioning of mediation "target levels" is more closely attuned to its
institutional self-interest than to the general interests of the Party-state,
further emphasizing the need to recognize the SPC's "institutional agency" in
shaping judicial policy.
The SPC's promotion of mediation is less blatantly utilitarian than some of
its other populist measures. In late 2010, the SPC commissioned the creation of
'24 See supra note 236.
243 Minzner, supra note 4, at 42-43.
244 Liu, supra note 234.
141 Id. at 41-42.
246 Insofar as such petitions are a measure of public unhappiness with judicial
outcomes-something the SPC seems to believe in, supra note 231, any decrease in
their volume would naturally support the argument that the SPC is succeeding in its
management of public opinion, an argument the SPC leadership has never failed to
trumpet whenever xinfang rates drop. See Qiu & Yang, supra note 233; Xiao, SPC Work
Report 2007, supra note 117; Wang, SPC Work Report 2011, supra note 73.
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a cartoon mascot for the Chinese judiciary,7 which serves no conceivable
purpose except the "softening" of the SPC's public image.248 At roughly the
same time, the SPC also announced the completion of a propaganda
documentary called The People's Judges. 9 While these measures are certainly
"populist," the fact that the highest court in the nation would endorse these
somewhat undignified attempts to win public favor seems to suggest that the
SPC's embrace of populism derives not only from ideological agreement, but
also from strong pragmatic motivations.
There are limitations, however, to the pragmatic benefits of populism.
Whatever short-term benefits it may provide the SPC, it cannot override the
SPC's longer-term interest in promoting legal professionalism. Ultimately, the
main institutional difference between the judiciary and other government
organs is that it possesses the power of adjudication. Many government organs
can mediate a dispute-some, in fact, arguably do it better than the
judiciary 5 -- but only the courts can regularly adjudicate. Whether the power
of adjudication is socially or politically significant depends, however, on
whether there is general adherence to legal norms, both substantive and
procedural. In other words, it depends on whether there is at least a "thin"
version of the rule of law.25' Thus, it is in the judiciary's institutional interest to
enforce its decisions rigorously and, moreover, to encourage other government
organs to obey legal norms. And because the judiciary's normative or moral
standing to take such action depends largely on its ability to apply the law
fairly and consistently, the judiciary also has a considerable incentive to
demand higher professional standards of its personnel. This does not mean
that the judiciary will always prefer the legal status quo: historically, courts
have often found it either desirable or necessary to push for significant legal
247 Fayuan Katong Xingxiang Shouci he Gongzhong Jianmian bing Zhengqiu Yijian (8
,- [The Judiciary's Mascot Is Revealed to the
Public for the First Time and Seeks Comments], Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Wangzhan (fi 'i
A'1;ZF]lk&) [SUP. PEOPLE'S CT.] (Dec. 4, 2010, 9:15 AM), http://www.court.gov.cn/
xwzx/fyxw/zgrmfyxw/201012/t2olo1204_n1804.htm.
'48 The SPC at least does not pretend otherwise. Id.
249 Shoubu "Renmin Faguan" Xingxiang Xuanchuanpian Shouying ( R9 ((A 9'))
R 4P-6Bj) [The Premiere of "The People's Judges," the judiciary's First Public
Image Advocacy Film], Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Wangzhan (RAJA '&RRM) [Sup.
PEOPLE'S CT.] (Dec. 3, 2O0), http://www.court.gov.cn/xwzx/fyxw/zgrmfyxw/201012/
t201012041H805.htm.
250 The main venues for mediation are supposedly specialized "people mediation
committees," not courts. See Vai lo Lo, Resolution of Civil Disputes in China, 18 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 117 (2001).
251 For the definition of "thin" and "thick" versions of the rule of law, see supra note 37.
54 Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2012)
change.25 Nonetheless, the judiciary's self-interest urges against "arbitrary" or
"unjustifiable" breaches of established law. What specifically constitutes an
"arbitrary" or "unjustifiable" breach depends on one's theory of jurisprudence
and legal change,25 3 but no matter which theory one abides by, the observation
that courts have a vested interest in promoting legal professionalism, both
personal and institutional, remains basically valid.
The judiciary does, of course, operate within strong institutional and
social constraints that frequently demand concessions from its general interest
in professionalism.254 Yet, if the SPC wishes to reliably enhance its institutional
competence and importance relative to other state and party organs, it will
inevitably need to boost the sociopolitical significance of the one function that
is largely unique to it. If we see the SPC as an institutional "rational actor," we
21' The empirical narrative provided in supra Part I is, to at least some significant extent,
a narrative of doctrinal change initiated by and implemented through the judiciary. See
particularly the series of pro-professionalism changes discussed at supra pp. 12-16.
253 It suffices to note that any law student who has taken an American legal history
course will feel quite at home debating the merits of "formalist" versus "progressive"
approaches towards legal change, a debate that has taken some new turns in recent
years. See DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW'S HISTORY: LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP (forthcoming) (refuting the notion that legal thought during the so-called
"formalist" era was preoccupied with abstract conceptions); BRIAN TAMANAHA, BEYOND
THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE (2010) (arguing that formalist portrayals of the era have
limited explanatory power); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAw, 1870-196o, at 33-64 (1992) (presenting a more traditional view of the
formalist/progressive dichotomy). Despite drastically different sociopolitical settings
and legal traditions, the same basic questions apply to Chinese legal reform: Who is
allowed to instigate legal change, and under what circumstances? More specifically, are
courts allowed to react independently to socioeconomic change by spearheading
doctrinal reform? These questions inevitably lead to a broader debate on what, exactly,
Chinese courts are designed to do, which any scholar in the Chinese law field is highly
familiar with. For a brief summary of the various positions in this debate, see Donald C.
Clarke, China's Jasmine Crackdown and the Legal System, CHINESE L. PROF BLOG (May
26, 2o), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china-law-prof blog/2o11/o5/chinas-
jasmine-crackdown-and-the-legal-system.html. See also Donald Clarke, Empirical
Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL
APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 164 (Erik Jensen & Thomas Heller eds., 2003)
("[Pierhaps Chinese courts are not designed to do, and should not do, the things
Western courts do."); PEERENBOOM, supra note 2 (presenting a more conventional "rule
of law"-based evaluation of the Chinese judiciary). Such issues have more than just
academic value, as the debate over the appropriate constitutional and legislative
position of the SPC continues to be of central importance in the Chinese legal world-
unsurprisingly, given the SPC's broad authority to issue interpretations and regulations
that very much resemble legislation. See, e.g., Li, supra note 197 (criticizing the SPC for
overstepping its constitutional authority in experimenting with "guiding cases"); Zhang,
supra note 221 (arguing that the issuance of guiding cases does not constitute
legislation).
254 See discussion supra pp. 4-5, 22-23.
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would expect it to maintain long-term advocacy of professionalization and
judicial independence, while occasionally diverging from that basic stance to
accommodate political necessity, public unhappiness, financial needs, or other
pragmatic concerns. This is precisely what we see in recent SPC activity:
although the SPC has certainly issued a substantial amount of populist
rhetoric, the specific policies it has created under that rhetorical umbrella
often seem unapologetically utilitarian, designed to handle specific
sociopolitical needs.25 At the same time, a fair number of the SPC's most
important policy initiatives have little to do with either populism or
professionalism, but simply attempt to enhance its financial health and
institutional power.256 Beneath all this pragmatic maneuvering, the SPC
continues to promote professionalism and the rule of law, placing them side-
by-side with its populist rhetoric and apparently ignoring any theoretical
inconsistencies. 5 7
This institutional "rational actor" model of SPC behavior also works
reasonably well when applied to the Xiao Yang era. A number of legal scholars
in Mainland China have, in fact, accused the SPC of power-hungry judicial
activism during the early 2000S, particularly through the ill-fated Qi Yuling
decision. 2 8 Where western scholars have generally seen positive developments
in judicial independence and professionalism,259 they saw an ambitious SPC
attempting to increase its own institutional authority relative to other state
and Party organs. More recently, however, political pressures-perhaps the
Party's response to sprouts of "judicial activism"-and signs of social
discontent have heightened the SPC's sense of vulnerability. It therefore
entered into a period of more openly pragmatic maneuvering, accentuated by
dashes of populism and a stronger emphasis on "judicial efficiency."
Essentially, the SPC was willing to provide strong support for professionalism
initiatives as long as the sociopolitical atmosphere remained largely benign.
Once external pressures began to intensify, it swiftly adapted through a variety
of measures that often escaped neat ideological categorization, while never
quite giving up on the promotion of legal professionalism.
The interpretation of the SPC as a pure institutional "rational actor" is a
"strong" version of the institutional pragmatism argument this Article has
attempted to make. It would predict that pragmatic concerns of self-interest
almost completely drown out other institutional motivations. A weaker but
probably more realistic version of the argument would place institutional
pragmatism alongside other, more ideological motivations. There is certainly
5 See discussion supra pp. 49-54 (unclear about the page perimeters you're referring
to).
256 See discussion supra Part II.
257 See discussion supra p.23 (unclear about the page perimeters you're referring to).
258 See discussion surrounding supra notes 55-57.
259 See discussion surrounding supra notes 6-7.
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no reason to doubt that many SPC judges have internalized either
professionalist or populist ideals or, in some logically murky fashion, both.
What this Article points out, however, is that numerous SPC activities bear no
clear relationship to either ideal and, in fact, contradict both. Instead,
institutional self-interest is most likely the key motivation for SPC policy-
making. Moreover, nearly every major SPC policy trend of the past eight or
nine years has made significant pragmatic sense for the Court. Other more
ideological factors may well have enhanced or limited certain policy trends-
perhaps, for example, the SPC might not have marched head-first into Qi
Yuling if its leadership had not genuinely believed in constitutional rule-of-law
ideals-but one can reasonably suggest, at least, that institutional pragmatism
has been a necessary, if not entirely sufficient, condition for major SPC
activity.
Compared, on the other hand, to studies that see the SPC as a loyal foot
soldier who simply carries out the Party-state's policy directives, the
arguments made here place far greater emphasis on the SPC's ability to shape
judicial policy based on its own interests, rather than those of the general
Party-state. The two sets of interests are often divergent: the Party-state has no
clear incentive to promote summary procedure or demand a simplified
marriage law-quite the opposite, the SPC's recent activity in these areas may
create significant socioeconomic inefficiencies that could eventually damage
the social stability that the Party-state so prizes. The Party-state also seemed
reluctant to sign onto the SPC's "guiding cases" system, perhaps wary of
potential judicial activism.2'6 Even the SPC's promotion of mediation arguably
promotes the SPC's short-term interests at significant long-term cost to the
Party-state. Finally, the SPC's dogged promotion of legal professionalism,
however tempered by populist rhetoric, suggests a clear awareness of where its
fundamental institutional interests lie, regardless of the external sociopolitical
atmosphere.
CONCLUSION
What institutional motivations drive judicial activity? What constitutes a
conventional answer varies heavily with discipline and field. American
scholars may, for example, hesitate to attach a self-interested motive to
developments in recent American constitutional law. Constitutional scholars
have certainly lodged accusations of blatant judicial activism against many
justices, but such accusations nonetheless tend to be about ideology, not self-
interest. 26 Some scholars consider, for example, the Rehnquist Court
"judicially activist" because it went against established precedent to promote a
conservative legal ideology, not because it consciously attempted to expand
26o See discussion surrounding supra notes 208-210
261 See discussion supra note 31.
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the Supreme Court's own institutional authority.262 Legal theories regularly
consider whether justices act upon ideological bias, be it racism, sexism, or any
number of "isms," ' 63 but somewhat rarer-with, of course, important
exceptions264-is the argument that they issued a decision primarily to shore
up the judiciary's financial security or enhance its position relative to other
branches of government. In fact, by regularly speaking of the Supreme Court's
"jurisprudence," scholars often seem to assume that the Supreme Court acts
mainly out of genuine intellectual or ideological affiliations. 65 This is
unsurprising: after the turmoil of the 193os,266 the Supreme Court has often
seemed so secure in its institutional position and embedded within a socio-
politically legitimate tradition of government that it has little need to promote
its institutional self-interest via Machiavellian maneuvers 67 Contemporary
Western European judiciaries are often similarly situated .6
262
E.g., THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO
MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 7 (2004); THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL AcTIVISM ON
THE RIGHT (Herman Schwartz ed., 2003) (critically assessing the Rehnquist Court's
positions on civil rights and liberties, federalism, and institutional powers).
263 E.g., Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices
Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995) (arguing that ideological values often influence Supreme
Court voting); Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment and
the Supreme Court, ioi HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1388-89 (1988) (describing charges of racism
against the Supreme Court); Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences and the
Supreme Court, 92. YALE L.J. 913 (1983) (discussing sexual biases in Supreme Court
decision-making). Often the charge is one of more general conservatism or liberalism.
E.g., THE REHNQUIST COURT, supra note 262; C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of
the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and
Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 355 (1981).
264 See supra note 32. More recently, scholars have debated whether a more assertive
executive might intimidate the Supreme Court into a more permissive jurisprudence of
executive power. See ACKERMAN, supra note 32, at 68-69 (arguing that this is an
imminent danger); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1688, 17O-O6 (2011) (reviewing Ackerman's arguments and arguing against them);
Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign
Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 785-86 (2011) (noting that, in recent cases
concerning war-on-terror decisions, "the Court has swept aside vigorous arguments by
the executive that it refrain from engagement on abstention or political question
grounds," and that "the Court has scarcely noted any doctrinal tradition of interpretive
'deference' on the meaning of the laws").
265 See discussion supra note 31.
z66 On Court Packing struggles during the New Deal, see, e.g., William E.
Leuchtenburg, FDR's Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, a Second Death, 1985 DUKE L.J.
673; LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT
(1967).
267 This is a prevalent but perhaps overly optimistic assumption. ACKERMAN, supra note
32, at 1. The secure life tenure of Supreme Court justices has been a source of concern
for some constitutional law scholars, most famously ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST
58 Columbia Journal ofAsian Law, Vol. 25, No. i (2012)
As we move away from supposedly strong, well-entrenched judiciaries in
governments that face no significant legitimacy problem, however, this
assumption swiftly ceases to apply. Perhaps the easiest way to see this is by
going back in time. For instance, legal historians have relatively few qualms
about portraying common law and equity judges in early modern England-or
perhaps, more generally, royal and ecclesiastical courts across Western
Europe-as engaging in "judicial competition" to strengthen their institutional
authority and influence.26 While they would also point out the more
intellectual considerations underlying the evolution of the writ of covenant or
the expansion of King's Bench jurisdiction via legal fictions, the argument that
pragmatic consideration of institutional self-interest was prominent in these
developments is well-accepted.2 70 Going further back in time, major theories of
Roman law likewise acknowledge that Roman jurists were predominantly
attracted by the personal prestige that legal service could bring and were thus
less interested in the rational development of legal doctrine than in pragmatic
problem solving.2 7
'
Scholars with extensive backgrounds in economics tend to apply "rational
actor" assumptions particularly thoroughly. The famous "legal origins" thesis,
for example, explicitly makes the assumption that late medieval judges and
juries in England and France alike decided whether to convict a defendant by
comparing the utility they would gain from a conviction with the retributive
damage they could expect from the defendant's relatives or social contacts.272
Similarly utilitarian views of institutional and personal decision-making are
quite common in political economy theories of legal or institutional history,
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1986)-a problem that
many Chinese jurists would probably love to have. Such concerns remain contentious
today. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme
Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 770 (2006); William Mishler
& Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The
Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 87 (1993).
But see supra notes 32, 33 and 264, which discuss important strands of legal scholarship
that sees the Supreme Court as susceptible to political pressures and considerations
even today.
268 The German Federal Constitutional Court, for example, is often considered the most
powerful and respected constitutional court in the world. See GEORGE VANBERG, THE
POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY (2005). For a more general review of the
rise of constitutionalism in recent decades, particularly in the Western world, see Bruce
Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997).
'69 See discussion supra note 29.
270 Id.
271 WATSON, supra note 29.
272 Edward L. Glaeser &Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 107 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002).
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notably in more recent legal scholarship on "jurisdictional competition. " " The
basic justification for this seems to be that legal personnel and institutions in
pre-modern or early modern societies enjoyed relatively weak security and
influence within the broader state apparatus, which also faced significant
political, military and legal challenges.274 These judiciaries faced not only great
uncertainties in external sociopolitical circumstances, but also considerable
ambiguity in their self-identity. It seems natural, therefore, to assume that
their decision-making incorporated strong elements of pragmatic self-interest.
This assumption continues to apply if we replace the temporal
modifications with geographic ones-that is, if we study contemporary
judiciaries in authoritarian, developing nations, especially those that have yet
to establish a strong, well-entrenched judiciary and legal profession and face
some measure of potential political instability. If we assume that late medieval
European jurists were willing to alter their judicial decisions based on
concerns of personal safety or political standing, then, by the same logic, it
seems reasonable to suspect that comparably vulnerable jurists in a young,
modern authoritarian state may also be willing to make similar concessions.
Here, however, the legal literature is quite underdeveloped. Scholars have
made significant progress in studying the judiciaries of authoritarian
developing nations, but they have more often focused on identifying the
functions that these judiciaries carry out for their respective states, rather than
studying them as entities capable of acting in institutional self-interest.27 This
is perhaps a natural consequence of the subject matter: given the authoritarian
nature of the state, one may expect the judiciary to have relatively little room
for self-interested maneuvering.
As we have attempted to demonstrate for the Chinese judiciary, however,
these expectations sometimes miss the mark and may miss more and more as
governments stabilize and societies grow. 76 One hypothetical but fairly
plausible chain of events is as follows: as societies grow in economic and
political complexity, laws governing sociopolitical behavior will likewise grow
in complexity. By no means will they inevitably converge upon Western legal
273 See, e.g., Klerman, supra note 29; Zywicki, supra note 29.
274 These are particularly evident in Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 272. See also the
discussion supra note 33.
275 See, e.g., the various examples cited in supra notes 3, 15. For a broader comparative
perspective on judiciaries in authoritarian regimes, see Tom Ginsburg & Tamir
Moustafa, Introduction, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES I (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2oo8), and the other essays in that
volume. While certainly a significant academic achievement, apart from the final essay,
Martin Shapiro, Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, in id. at 326, which lists some broad
theoretical observations on judicial behavior and motivation, the other, more empirical,
essays in the volume focus, perhaps justifiably, on the question of when and why
authoritarian regimes grant substantive powers to courts-a question that may precede
the examination of the judiciaries' own institutional motivations in logical order.
276 See discussion surrounding supra notes 16-18, 94, 95.
6o Columbia Journal ofAsian Law, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2012)
models,"Tz but institutions that specialize in legal affairs' will still grow in
authority and independence as the legal system expands and professional legal
training becomes more valuable. As legal professionals come to enjoy greater
sociopolitical influence, they will then push for greater expansion and
professionalization of the legal system, partly because their training
encourages them to internalize such norms, but also because it is in their own
interest to do so-as pre-modern European jurists have found, time and time
again.278
There is, therefore, good reason to study judiciaries in authoritarian states
as institutional "rational actors" that are capable of pragmatic maneuvering
similar to what we regularly attribute to pre-modern or early modern
European judiciaries. No one would deny that, compared to its democratic
peers, an authoritarian state probably has greater incentive and ability to keep
its judiciary under a tighter leash. But the appropriate mental image is at least
that of a leash, and not a series of puppet strings that control every notable
judicial development. 7 9
I have argued here that institutional pragmatism is the best explanation
for a series of recent SPC activities, ranging from the enhancement of "judicial
efficiency" to the establishment of "guiding cases." It also does a surprisingly
good job of explaining both the SPC's well-publicized promotion of legal
populism and, perhaps ironically, its ongoing commitment to further
professionalization. Furthermore, institutional pragmatism may also help us
predict where Chinese legal reform is headed. Assuming for the moment that
greater legal professionalization is, in fact, a desirable objective,z8' perhaps
there is greater reason for optimism under a theory of institutional
pragmatism than if the SPC has actually internalized "legal populism" as a
long-term ideal for judicial reform, or that it is simply a largely "mindless"
extension of the Party-state. This Article has presented the SPC as an entity
both willing and capable of pursuing its institutional self-interest, but it has
also argued that the SPC's self-interest, over the long run, is congruent with
legal professionalism. To the extent we must recognize that the SPC has only
limited maneuvering room within the constraints of Party-state policy-and
" Within the Chinese context, see particularly Clarke, China's Jasmine Crackdown and
the Legal System, supra note 253; and Clarke, Empirical Research into the Chinese
Judicial System, supra note 253. For a broader comparative and theoretical perspective,
see Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect,
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003) (discussing the conditions under which cross-nation and
cross-culture legal transplants are likely, plausible and successful).
278 See discussion supra note 29.
279 See Ginsburg & Moustafa, supra note 275, at 2 (noting that more recent scholarship
"cuts against" the traditional presumption that courts in authoritarian regimes were
mere pawns").
28o At least in economic dimensions, this is not an absolute certainty. World Bank
studies suggest, for example, that the more formalistic a judicial system is, the less
economically efficient it becomes. Danjkov et al., supra note 134.
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that the Party-state's, policy-making rests upon far more complex
considerations of social stability, economic development, and political
legitimacy-these arguments suggest that at least one important institutional
player will consistently possess a strong incentive to promote legal
professionalization.
Barring drastic and unforeseeable sociopolitical shocks, it seems highly
unlikely that the SPC will completely abandon its basic commitment to ftrther
professionalization. At the same time, the SPC probably will not hesitate to
temporarily shelve that commitment for short-term institutional gain. Recent
examples include the promotion of populism and the decidedly utilitarian
pursuit of "judicial efficiency." This might cause judicial reform activists a fair
amount of frustration and anxiety, but it probably does not foreshadow long-
term regression away from rule of law ideals. The SPC's institutional self-
interest is a reliable and reasonably powerful ally, and-over the long run, at
least-the activists actually have it on their side.
